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Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund
Burke's Conservatism with the Views of Five
Conservative, Academic Judges
JAMES G. WILSON*
The author evaluates the constitutional jurisprudence ofjudges
Posner, Bork, Easterbrook, Scalia, and Winter by contrasting their
views with the political theory of noted conservative Edmund Burke.
These judges' conception of politics, legitimacy, separation of powers,
and tyranny differ significantly from Burke's views, thereby raising
questions about the nature of these jurists' conservatism.
On June 17, 1986, after this article went to press, Chief Justice
Burger resigned from the Supreme Court. President Reagan nomi-
nated Justice Rehnquist as the sixteenth Chief Justice, and Judge
Scalia as Justice Rehnquist's successor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
President Reagan has successfully influenced the American judi-
cial system by appointing five academics from leading law schools to
the United States Court of Appeals: Robert Bork, Richard Posner,
Frank Easterbrook, Antonin Scalia, and Ralph Winter, Jr. Each of
these conservative scholars played important roles in both criticizing
liberal Supreme Court decisions and in proposing alternative legal
visions. Bork provided an updated version of Weschler's theory of
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author would
like to thank Robin West, Joel Finer, Marjorie Kornhauser, and Mimi Lord for their
assistance. Thanks also to the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for its generous support.
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neutral principles to justify limited judicial review of constitutional
claims. Posner is the acknowledged leader of the law and economics
school. Easterbrook created a variety of rules of statutory and consti-
tutional construction that limit judicial review. Scalia condemned
affirmative action. Winter rearticulated, in constitutional terminol-
ogy, classic objections to wealth distribution. One or more of these
judges will gain even more power if he is appointed to the Supreme
Court. In fact, President Reagan recently nominated Scalia to the
Supreme Court. Even assuming that they all remain at their existing
posts, these five jurist-scholars will provide intellectual leadership to
their colleagues on the bench, bar, and academy. Their opinions and
their law review articles will be read with more frequency and
intensity.
This article, the first of two planned articles, probes these judges'
constitutional jurisprudence as presented in their scholarly works,
speeches, and testimony before Congress. The second piece, to later
be published in this Law Review, will study these judges' constitu-
tional decisions to see how consistent those opinions are with their
earlier political perspectives, their academic theories of judicial
review, and their positions on appropriate and inappropriate forms of
constitutional argument. Initial research indicates that, except for
Scalia, their opinions are somewhat more moderate than their aca-
demic writings.
There are several reasons for first dwelling upon theory. The
presentation can become quickly confusing if one has to compare not
only five views of scholars living in a world of academic discretion,
but then contrast each of those perspectives with the decisions those
academics make in the far more constrained role as an intermediate
appellate judge, a role that may constrain each of these men differ-
ently. Furthermore, one needs to study their constitutional jurispru-
dence to see how they attempt to resolve two intertwined dilemmas.
If these men believe they can implement any of their previously held
constitutional viewpoints, including the theme of judicial restraint,
they have to explain how they can use their theories while condemn-
ing liberals for applying values. Furthermore, they have to explain
how they are acting conservatively when also proposing significant
alterations in the existing judicial interpretation of the Constitution.
As Judge Posner has pointed out, conservative judges can be caught
in a process which perpetually ratchets to the left; temporary liberal
majorities feel free to impose their views, but conservatives can only
prevent new theories while having to accept all existing doctrine.'
1. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS; CRISIS AND REFORM 217 (1985). Posner argues
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All five of these scholars have invoked the concept of legitimacy2
to attempt to resolve these two potential contradictions. They claim
that legitimacy is primarily found in the ballot box to resolve constitu-
tional issues and in the market to resolve regulatory issues. Not only
do those two structures best reflect existing preferences, but they also
are the most democratic, the most accountable. The Supreme Court
should defer to the legislature and the executive since those two
branches are elected, and thus legitimated by the democratic process.
The Court should only construe the Constitution to void legislation
that conflicts with the intentions of those who drafted the Constitu-
tion and/or its amendments. Such action would not be
countermajoritarian because the Constitution itself reflects the will of
a supermajority.
On the other hand, these scholar/judges have maintained that
that although stare decisis is usually considered a principle of judicial restraint: "[A judge]...
could be an activist judge who was deferential toward precedent or a restrained judge who was
not." Id. Judicial activism is primarily defined by the judge's relation to outside society, not
by his relation to his institution's tradition.
2. Discussion about legitimacy is not limited to conservatives. Critical legal scholar
Duncan Kennedy has stated that hierarchies are illegitimate because they are not voluntary,
which is the basic criteria for legitimacy. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 567, 577 (1982). Although "voluntariness" may have more
substantive preconditions than "consent," Kennedy seems to be approaching Judge Posner's
jurisprudence, which relies primarily upon agreement to validate acts. See, e.g., West,
Authority, Autonomy and Choice. The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of
Franz Ka/ka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
William Fletcher finds federal court regulation of public institutions is legitimated because
such supervision is necessary. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982). Fletcher defines such necessity in terms of
political failure: "The only legitimate basis for a federal judge to take over the political
function in devising or choosing a remedy in an institutional suit is the demonstrated
unwillingness or incapacity of the political body." Id. at 694. Conversely, he concludes that
power is used illegitimately when there is no "effective control over the person exercising that
power." Id. at 642. Such a process-oriented view of legitimacy can deflect the legitimacy
inquiry from the more fundamental questions of tyranny and justice.
The legitimacy debate has extended to debates on how to interpret the Constitution: "An
interpretation is legitimate (which is not the same as correct) only insofar as it purports to
interpret some language of the document, and only insofar as the interpretation is within the
boundaries at least suggested by that language." Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399,
431 (1985). In his textbook, Professor Gunther traces the legitimacy debate back to Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-
21 (1lth ed. 1985).
Finally, this article is not considering legitimacy in the Weberian sense that legitimacy is a
force that convinces the populace that their government deserves allegiance. That positive
description of the sociological effects of the law differs from the normative conclusion that
certain judicial opinions are "illegitimate." In his article attacking the Weberian idea for being
meaningless, Professor Hyde also distinguishes between the use of the concept of legitimacy as
a description and as a judgment. Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of the
Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379, 419.
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any Court opinions primarily formed by the values of Justices can be
overruled as illegitimate, as being worse than unconstitutional or
wrongheaded. These conservative judges conclude they would not be
imposing their own views; they would be seeking to implement the
views of the Framers. Nor would they be judicially active; their juris-
prudence only permits them to interpret the text to implement the
Framers' original intentions.
The final reason for separating theory from practice is to present
in some detail the political perspective of Edmund Burke, the first and
best advocate of conservatism. Naturally, Burke's belief that one
should defer to existing institutions exacerbates the irony of modern
conservative activism, which repudiates the Warren Court tradition.
But that single rhetorical maneuver would hardly justify arguing that
these jurists are not very Burkean. Anyone can claim to be conserva-
tive, to support the status quo, if he chooses that time in history when
those in power best reflected his current views.3 The major reason to
study Burke is that Burke provides less support to the basic assump-
tions of contemporary right-wing jurisprudence than most modern
liberals or conservatives believe. Judge Bork's frequent invocation of
Burkean arguments does not signify that Bork and his colleagues
ought to have a monopoly on Burke's perspective. Indeed, these
judges are not just caught in dilemmas caused by being conservatives;
in many ways, they are not Burkean conservatives at all.
One need only return to the idea of legitimacy to begin to see the
gap between Burke and these five judges. Burke properly evaluated
the legitimacy of a constitution or of an institution's actions by assess-
ing its historical ability to resist tyranny.4 That partially indetermi-
3. Two major themes run through Burke's work. He applauds institutions and traditions
that have survived the test of time. But as noted above, pure traditionalism does not provide us
with very much direction in our volatile and diverse society. There are so many traditions
from which to choose. Burke defends England's Constitution not only because it is ancient,
but also because it provides for a mixed government. Although this article will periodically
consider the tradition theme, it will primarily focus on the methodoloy Burke used to defend
the English Constitution. We shall see that his way of looking at a constitution and at a mixed
government that closely resembles our constitutional structure differs radically from the
perspective of the five judges we are also studying. Yet Burke's specific political positions
frequently, but not always, are echoed by modern conservatives. Thus, the gap between
modem conservatives and Burke is not total, but is nevertheless far larger than most scholars
might initially believe.
4. Professor Tribe links this article's two major themes of legitimacy and tyranny by
arguing that belief in the former may facilitate the latter: "[I] believe that all exercises of
power by some over others-even with what passes for the latter's consent-are and must
remain deeply problematic that I find all legitimating theories not simply amusing in their
pretentions but, in the end, as dangerous as they are unconvincing." L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 6 (1985). Labelling an action "legitimate" implies a perfect
understanding of right and wrong: "It is to say that, in matters of power, the end of doubt and
[Vol. 40:913
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nate (since it is historically bound) perspective generates a better mix
of liberty, equality, and community than the views of the five jurists.
Such moral opposition to injustice also reveals the extent of the gap
between Burke's politics and contemporary conservative jurispru-
dence, which is heavily positivist. For instance, Burke argued that
certain revolutions are legitimate; legitimacy encompasses more than
legality. Finally, Burke's perspective is particularly relevant because
he consistently defended England's mixed Constitution as the form of
government that best combats tyranny. His specific defenses and criti-
cisms of the Crown, the Parliament, and the aristocracy remain perti-
nent to understanding the proper blend of executive, legislative, and
judicial power under our Constitution. The best way to evaluate the
propositions that these conservatives are not Burkean conservatives
and that Burke's conservatism offers needed guidance to contempo-
rary American constitutional theory is to first study in some detail
Burke's complex political perspective.
II. THE COMPLEX POLITICS OF EDMUND BURKE
When Edmund Burke assaulted the ideology underlying the
French Revolution in his Reflections on the Revolution in France,5 he
not only finally achieved the fame and impact that he had sought, but
also brilliantly articulated a set of arguments that seriously questioned
any proposed change. Although Burke was criticizing a bourgeois
of distrust is the beginning of tyranny." Id. at 7. Instead of making the next step-arguing
that tyranny itself is the central issue-Tribe remains fascinated with indeterminacy.
Although tyranny is an indefinite concept, it provides more guidance than Tribe's general
request to "begin the process of replacing arrogant certitudes about our often unshared pasts
with a more open search for a shared future." Id. at 267.
The anti-tyranny standard provides both less and more scope than Sedler's individual
rights criteria. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment
and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 136 (1983). The violation of some alleged
individual rights might not be considered unconstitutionally tyrannical: for instance,
preventing an employee from entering into a contract to work for more than 50 hours a week.
But Sedler's test does not aid us in resolving separation of powers and federalism issues, while
Burke's approach explicitly addresses that problem. Burke typically argued that his opponents
were becoming tyrannical by seeking excessive power for one branch of the mixed government
at the expense of the other branches. See infra text accompanying notes 42-48.
This article does not mean to imply that combatting tyranny is the only test of legitimacy.
Yet focusing on prevention of evil is the best place to begin the legitimacy inquiry because the
"bad" may be easier to recognize than the "good." As Kant observed, "it is misfortune that
the concept of happiness is so indefinite that, although each person wishes to attain it, he can
never definitely and self-consistently state what it is he really wishes and wills." I. KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALITY 35 (L.W. Beck trans. 1959), quoted in B.
AUNE, KANT'S THEORY OF MORALS 39 (1979). To put the issue more specifically, more of us
will agree that extermination camps are tyrannical than will agree that equality of income is
just.
5. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (lst ed. n.p. 1790).
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revolution which had toppled a monarchy, a clergy, and an aristoc-
racy, the victorious middle class subsequently appropriated his argu-
ments to defend their regimes. His views continue to inspire modem
American conservatives. In a recent speech on the morality of judges,
Judge Robert Bork confidently blended Burke's argument that the
French Revolution was misguided because of its excessive reliance on
abstract rights with his own thesis that judges should limit their
morality to determining the morality of the legislation they are scruti-
nizing. 6 Irving Kristol echoes Burke in his condemnation of radicals'
excessive political expectations and in his applause for the average
person's unquestioning acceptance of existing society.'
With the notable exception of Alexander Bickel,' whose political
views may be as difficult to categorize as Burke's, virtually all liberal
6. R. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1984).
7. 9 I. KRISTOL, ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 62-63, 69, 149 (1972).
Burke's writings have also inspired Russell Kirk:
Burke's ideas did more than establish islands in the sea of radical thought: they
provided the defenses of conservatism, on a great scale, defenses that still stand
and are not liable to fall in our time .... Our age ... seems to be groping for
certain of the ideas which Burke's inspiration formed into a system of social
preservation.
R. KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND FROM BURKE TO SANTAYANA 79 (1960).
8. Bickel argued that Burke's antipathy toward theory is very relevant to a skeptical
world:
Our problem, as much as Burke's, is that we cannot govern, and should not, in
submission to the dictates of abstract theories, and that we cannot live, much less
govern, without some 'uniform rule and scheme of life,' without principles,
however provisionally and skeptically held. Burke's conservatism, if that is what
it was, belongs to the liberal tradition, properly understood and translated to our
time.
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 25 (1975). In a short review of Bickel's THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT, Robert Bork wrote that Bickel used Burke to repudiate contractari-
anism and egalitarianism, both of which may generate tyranny. Bork, Alexander M. Bickel,
Political Philsopher, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 419, 420-21.
-rofessor Kronman argued that Bickel was continuing the Burkean tradition by empha-
sizing prudence as a practical political virtue. Kronman claims that Bickel believed that soci-
ety is not formed by contract: "Unlike the contractarian, however, the Whig looks for the
values that sustain his society in its history and traditions, in the experience of an actual past,
and not in some imaginary antecedent condition from which the contingencies of historical
experience have all been carefully expunged." Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1603 (1985). The proper test is consent: "What the Whig
values, above all else, is workable accommodation of existing interests and ideals, one to which
those affected are willing to give their consent even though the accomodation itself is theoreti-
cally indefensible. Without consent, stable government is impossible and without government,
all other human goods are unattainable." Id. at 1604.
The dichotomy between contract and consent seems exaggerated. Burke, for instance,
justified the Whig Rebellion because the King violated his contract with the people. See infra
note 82 and accompanying text. The big difference between Burke and the contractarians is
not in the use of the metaphor of contract, but in describing how the social contract is formed.
Do we rely upon theory as the primary legitimating test or do we premise the social contract
1986] BURKEAN AND CONTEMPORARY CONSER VA TISM 919
legal academics and critical jurisprudence theorists also equate Burke
with contemporary conservatism. For instance, in his avowedly lib-
eral defense of Professor Laurence Tribe from the blistering criticism
of critical legal theorist Mark Tushnet, Professor Stephen Schiffrin
assumes that the adjective "Burkean" is a perjorative:
Tushnet portrays Professor Tribe as a Burkean (thus conflat-
ing conservatism and Tribe's brand of liberalism) and goes on to
call him corrupt, suggesting that his scholarship is directed to seek-
ing public office and that it lacks integrity. A public relations firm
would never have cleared... Tribe's position on state action, crim-
inal procedure, or many other topics. If ambition truly reigned
over integrity, Tribe could have tried to be a shade more Burkean. 9
This cardboard version of a Burke relentlessly opposed to change
and to rights is easily discredited by reading his works and studying
his biographers. We then face a man of many dimensions, a man who
provides insight and guidance to both the contemporary right and
left. Depending upon the issue, Burke was a reactionary conservative,
a bourgeois reformer, or even a revolutionary. Burke believed that
one should determine legitimacy by evaluating an institution's histori-
cal ability to resist tyranny.' ° Carefully reviewing his postulates and
arguments helps answer two questions raised by such a thesis: how
are we to determine the meaning of tyranny, and if history plays a
primary role in that definition, won't the definition be hopelessly inde-
terminate? At the very least, the technique might please Burke: "Cir-
cumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in
reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and dis-
criminating effect.""1 This sketch of Burke's life will not introduce
any new historical data-indeed, the theory that Burke held compli-
upon the consensual meeting of real minds in real history? A detailed discussion of this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.
9. Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1114
n.42 (1983).
Professor Perry commences his most recent inquiry into constitutional interpretation with
an admiring quotation from Alistar Maclntyre: "Traditions, when vital, embody continuities
of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dying or dead." A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 206 (1981), quoted in Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition,
and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985).
Another example is Professor Cover's reference to Burke as an opponent to natural law.
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 22-25 (1975). This utilization of Burke is somewhat misleading
because Burke vigorously opposed slavery. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, Burke saw morality playing a dominant role in political discourse; he was wary
of the current idiom of natural law because of its oversimplifications and its excessive
abstraction.
10. See E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (T. Mahoney ed.
1982) (1st ed. n.p. 1790).
11. Id. at 8.
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cated, even contradictory, political views is unoriginal., 2 Yet, such a
narrative is a precondition to applying Burke's beliefs to the modes of
conservatism articulated by the five academic judges now sitting on
the court of appeals.
A. Young Burke
Burke's politics cannot be completely understood without some
knowledge of his personal background. Although he became its most
articulate advocate, Burke was not a member of the English aristoc-
racy. Born in 1729 in Dublin, Ireland, to a Protestant lawyer and a
Catholic mother, Burke was always aware of his middle class origins.
Professor Isaac Kramnick argues that Burke's political ambivalence is
traceable to his relatively humble origins and to excessive tensions
with his moody father, both of which were ameliorated by his
12. Scholars differ dramatically on this basic point. Professor Isaac Kramnick uses a
Freudian approach to support his thesis that "[i]nvestigating the relationship between Burke's
private and public self indeed stands him on his head. No longer the dogmatic ideologue that
conventional wisdom portrays, Burke emerges a figure of uncertainty and ambivalence. No
longer the conservative prophet, Burke emerges the ambivalent radical." I. KRAMNICK, THE
RAGE OF EDMUND BURKE 11 (1977).
Francis Canavan concedes that Burke's thought is flawed because he never articulated,
much less organized, his basic philosophical assumptions. F. CANAVAN, THE POLITICAL
REASON OF EDMUND BURKE 52-53 (1960). Nevertheless, Burke consistently applied a form
of practical political reason based upon both pragmatic and metaphysical concepts. For
example, Burke wrote one of his friends that "I love order so far as I am able to understand it,
for the universe is order." Id. at 19 (quoting Letter from Edmund Burke to the Archbishop of
Nisibi (Dec. 14, 1791), cited in Somerset, Edmund Burke, England, and the Papacy, 202
DUBLIN REV. 140 (1938)). George Sabine has found Burke's commitment to a mixed
government only one manifestation of a greater belief in prescription:
Our constitution is a prescriptive constitution; it is a constitution whose sole
authority is that it has existed time out of mind .... Your king, your lords, your
judges, your juries, grand and little, are all prescriptive .... Prescription is the
most solid of all titles, not only to property, but, which is to secure that property,
to government ....
G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 609 (1961) (quoting E. Burke, Reform of
Representation in the House of Commons (1782), in 6 WORKS 146 (Bohn edition 1861)). Sab-
ine concludes that Burke's commitment to tradition not only led to mystification of existing
institutions but also to the fallacy that the existing government is the same thing as the society:
"This tendency to idealize the state by making it the bearer of all that has the highest value for
civilization became characteristic of Hegel and of the English idealists." Id. at 616. Burke's
statism can be exaggerated. He believed in opposing many existing government policies and
believed both the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution were justified.
Nevertheless, deference to prescription is a major Burkean premise. The article does not
emphasize the premise because the author wishes to demonstrate the flexibility of Burke's
other political beliefs. But even if one takes a more positivist view of Burke, such a view does
not completely support modern conservative legal theory. One can make the Burkean argu-
ment that the conservatives should defer to the liberal activist tradition because it is a part of
our society's inherited culture.
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mother's love. I3 Burke battled his father when he refused to continue
to study law, preferring to pursue a literary career, and his rejection of
the legal profession helps explain why he consistently criticized law-
yers and laws throughout his career. Burke scorched legal education
with rhetoric that would make critical legal studies Professor Duncan
Kennedy envious:
Thus the law has been confined and drawn up into a narrow
and inglorious study, and that which should be the leading science
in every well-ordered commonwealth remained in all the barbarism
of the rudest times, . . . insomuch that the study of our jurispru-
dence presented to liberal and well-educated minds, even in the
best authors, hardly anything but barbarous terms, ill explained, a
coarse, but not a plain expression, an indigested method, and a
species of reasoning the very refuse of the schools, which deduced
the spirit of the law, not from original justice or legal conformity,
but from causes foreign to it and altogether whimsical. Young
men were sent away with an incurable, and, if we regard the man-
ner of handling rather than the substance, a very well-founded
disgust. "4
In 1748, at the age of nineteen, Burke wrote for and edited a
weekly periodical, The Reformer, which was hardly conservative. He
first graphically described the misery of the poor:
As for their Food, it is notorious they seldom taste Bread or
Meat; their Diet, in Summer, is Potatoes and sour Milk; in Winter,
when something is required comfortable, they are still worse, living
on the same Root, made palatable only by a little Salt, and accom-
panied with Water;... it is no uncommon Sight to see half a dozen
Children run quite naked out of a Cabin, scarcely distinguishable
from the Dunghill, to the great Disgrace of our Country with For-
eigners .... 15
Burke claimed that the decadent aristocracy caused this squalor:
13. I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 53-56.
14. E. BURKE, An Essay Towards an Abridgment of the English History, in 7 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 477 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke wrote
this essay in 1757 in three separate pieces.). Numerous other examples exist of Burke's limited
respect for the law, legal learning, and lawyers. For instance, he stated that the law is "a
science which does more to quicken and invigorate the understanding than all the other kinds
of learning put together; but it is not apt, except in persons very happily born, to open and
liberalize the mind exactly in the same proportion." E. BURKE, Speech on American Taxation,
in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 38 (Beaconsfield edition 1901)
(Burke delivered this speech on Apr. 19, 1774.). Burke explained how the narrowness of legal
training leads to political miscalculation: "Mr. Grenville thought better of the wisdom and
power of human legislation than in truth it deserves." Id.
15. I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 61 (quoting Samuels, The Early Life 297-98 (1923)
reprinting Burke, 1 THE REFORMER passim (1748)).
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Who, after having seen this [poverty], comes to town and
beholds the sumptuous and expensive Equipages, their Treats and
Diversions, can contain the highest indignation? Such Follies con-
sidered in themselves, are but ridiculous; but when we see the bitter
consequences of them, 'twere Inhumanity to laugh .... I fancy,
many of our fine Gentlemen's Pageantry would be greatly tar-
nished, were their gilded coaches to be preceded and followed by
the miserable Wretches, whose labor supports them .... 16
Burke then presented a model "gentleman of fortune," who epito-
mized the middle class values of hard work and sobriety, as the
solution:
When he designed the improvement of this, he did not take
the ordinary Method of establishing Horse races and Assemblies,
which do but encourage Drinking and Idleness but at a much
smaller expense he introduced a Manufacture which, though not
very considerable, employed the whole town, and in time made it
opulent. 7
In his early twenties, Burke married and also became very close
to his cousin Will Burke, an aggressive, unscrupulous speculator who
initially made both of them a small fortune in the stock market.
Burke then bought a huge estate in Beaconsfield in 1768 for twenty
thousand pounds, II where he settled with his wife, his son Richard,
his cousin Will, and his younger brother Dick, who was known as a
cheat.' 9 But "the Burkes," as they were labelled by London society,
quickly lost sixty percent of their capital in the stock market.2 ° They
never could be sure that they would keep their magnificent estate.
Although they entertained constantly, they cut corners to keep their
home. A visitor described their unusual living conditions: "I lived
with him & his Lady at Beaconsfield among Dirt Cobwebs, Pictures
and Statutes that would not have disgraced the City of Paris itself:
where Misery & Magnificence reign in all their Splendor, & in perfect
Amity." 2'
Burke relied upon aristocratic patronage throughout his career.
In 1765, after six years of service, he bitterly left his first patron, Wil-
liam Hamilton, because Hamilton wanted Burke to devote himself
exclusively to Hamilton's career and to stop writing.22 Burke then
16. Id. at 61-62.
17. Id. at 62.
18. T. COPELAND, The Little Dogs and All, in OUR EMINENT FRIEND EDMUND BURKE
51 (1949).
19. Id. at 50.
20. Id. at 53.
21. Id. at 55.
22. I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 101.
[Vol. 40:913
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obtained a seat in the House of Commons with the help of his cousin
Will, who had also found an aristocratic patron, Lord Veney. Burke
made an immediate impact with dazzling speeches in Parliament. His
friend, Dr. Johnson, correctly predicted that Burke would soon be
"one of the first men in the country. "23
Burke then found a particularly powerful patron when he
became personal secretary to Lord Rockingham, leader of the Rock-
ingham Whigs. Lord Rockingham loaned Burke almost thirty thou-
sand pounds and cancelled those debts in his will.24 Several of
Burke's biographers have concluded that this uncertain economic sta-
tus partially explains Burke's need for, and admiration of, the inher-
ited aristocracy, and his anger and frustration over never fully
becoming a member.2 5
B. Burke's Rise to Eminence
In 1756, Burke first expressed his conservative politics in A Vin-
dication of Natural Society,26 a parody of the Enlightenment theorist
Bolingbroke. He demonstrated how relentless use of reason to further
virtue and truth not only undercuts the legitimacy of organized reli-
gion, Bolingbroke's target, but also of all political societies. Monar-
chies lead to despotism;2 7 aristocracies are haughty and capricious,
nothing more than disorderly tyrannies; 28 and democracies hate merit
while degenerating into self-indulgent mobs.29 Mixed governments,
which combine all three forms of government, constantly fluctuate
between the types of tyranny typical of each of the three underlying
forms: "The Government is one Day, arbitrary Power in a single Per-
son; another, a juggling Confederacy of a few to cheat the Prince and
enslave the People; and the third, a frantic and unmanageable
Democracy."3"
In a subsequently published Preface,3' Burke wrote that such elo-
quent arguments undercut themselves by leaving us with no society,
no religion. Excessive reliance on reason is more than dangerously
anarchistic; it both denies our true inability to understand our society
23. T. COPELAND, supra note 18, at 60.
24. Id. at 61.
25. See, e.g., I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, passim.
26. E. BURKE, A VINDICATION OF NATURAL SOCIETY (London 1756) [hereinafter cited
as E. BURKE, VINDICATION].
27. Id. at 45.
28. Id. at 53, 55.
29. Id. at 57, 59.
30. Id. at 72.
31. E. BURKE, A VINDICATION OF NATURAL SOCIETY (2d ed. London 1757) (1st ed.
London 1756).
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and implies that we have a right to comprehend our system: "[W]hat
would become of the World if the Practice of all moral Duties, and
the Foundations of Society, rested upon having their Reasons made
clear and demonstrative to every Individual?"32
C. Burke's Attack on the Crown
Burke evaluated specific political issues by demonstrating how
his opponents' position threatened the English Constitution, a prop-
erly mixed form of government. Burke supported England's mixed
government both because of its wisdom, which could be inferred from
its antiquity, and because it best prevents tyranny by distributing and
balancing power. When, in 1770, he wrote Thoughts on the Present
Discontents3 3 in response to King George III's attempts to preclude
Mr. Wilkes from being seated in the House of Commons after win-
ning an election in Middlesex, Burke combined a defense of the
existing electoral system with his right to dissent from the use of
excessive executive power.
In the very first paragraph, Burke clearly stated that his conser-
vatism is not mere statism: "[T]hough [dissenters] displease the rulers
for the day, they are certainly of service to the cause of Govern-
ment."34 Indeed, unquestioning deference is dangerous: "I repeat it
again-He that supports every Administration, subverts all Govern-
ment."35 Thus, Burke reasoned, dissenting parties like the Rock-
inghman Whigs are not treasonous factions, but legitimate parts of
the Constitution. 6 Furthermore, such parties also stabilize societies
by developing healthy friendships.3 7 Burke praised ancient Rome's
tolerance of political disagreement: "For it was then thought no
crime, to endeavour by every honest means to advance the superiority
and power those of your own sentiments and opinions.""8
Burke defended political opposition by placing ultimate power
not with any administration, but with the people: "The temper of the
people amongst whom he presides ought therefore to be the first study
32. Id. at 9.
33. E. BURKE, Thoughts on the Present Discontents, in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
OF EDMUND BURKE 252 (P. Langford ed. 1981) (text first appeared in Apr. 1770) [hereinafter
cited as E. BURKE, Discontents].
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id. at 312.
36. Burke first made this argument the year before in the first sentence of his first major
political work: "Party divisions, whether on the whole operating for good or evil, are things
inseparable from free government." E. BURKE, Observations on a Late State of the Nation, in 2
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 110 (P. Langford ed. 1981).
37. E. BURKE, Discontents, supra note 33, at 316.
38. Id.
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of a Statesman."3 9 Whenever tension might arise, Burke would be
sympathetic to average citizens' reactions: "[I]n all disputes between
them and their rulers, the presumption is at least upon a par in favour
of the people."'  The rulers are only "trustees for the people," and
the House of Commons must be protected from monarchial encroach-
ment because it best reflects the "feelings of the nation. '41
Burke began his attack of the King's supporters by defining des-
potism: "It is the nature of despotism to abhor power held by any
means but its own momentary pleasure; and to annihilate all interme-
diate situations between boundless strength on its own part, and total
debility on the part of the people."'4 He argued that the Crown's
attempt to control the House reflects that technique: "It must be
always the wish of an unconstitutional Statesman, that an House of
Commons who are entirely dependent upon him, should have every
right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleasure. '43 These
potential despots also tried to gain power which the people never
agreed to give them: "The people of a free Commonwealth, who have
taken such care that their laws should be the result of general consent,
cannot be so senseless as to suffer their executory system to be com-
posed of persons on whom they have no dependence."'  The Wilkes
affair demonstrated how the administration engaged in politically
biased prosecutions. 45 The executive improperly tried to control elec-
tions, in an effort to assure that connections would prevail over popu-
larity: "A restoration of the right of free election is a preliminary
indispensable to every other reformation."46 Burke also found claims
of necessity and of "new powers" to be indicia of tyranny: "Any new
powers exercised in the House of Lords, or in the House of Commons,
or by the Crown, ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious
jealousy of a free people."47
Burke reminded the reader that he was not attempting to strip
the Crown of its rightful amount of power, but was only trying to
maintain the proper blend of the three forms of government: "Our
constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with steep precipices, and
deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing it from a dangerous
39. Id. at 252.
40. Id. at 255.
41. Id. at 292.
42. Id. at 259-60.
43. Id. at 258.
44. Id. at 278.
45. Id. at 298.
46. Id. at 308.
47. Id. at 267.
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leaning towards one side, there may be a risque of oversetting it on the
other."48 We cannot decide which branch is overreaching based upon
any abstract theory; we can only make that determination by evaluat-
ing the effects of given policies4 9 and the extent of danger: "The ques-
tion, on the influence of a Court, and of a Peerage, is not, which of the
two dangers is the most eligible, but which is the most imminent." 50
Nor can one assess the relative strength of institutions solely through
the structure of the positive law. Invoking an image later to be made
famous by Chief Justice Marshall, Burke believed that administrative
discretion must be based upon the "prudence and uprightness of Min-
isters of State. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon
them. Without them, your Commonwealth is no better than scheme
upon paper; and not a living, acting, effective constitution."' 51
D. Burke the Revolutionary
Burke consistently applied a limited set of theories and argu-
ments to any political issue that he analyzed. Condemning his oppo-
nents for being excessively theoretical, he combined dazzling rhetoric
with his thorough knowledge of the facts and underlying conception
of a mixed government. His defense of the Americans both before
and during the American Revolution included a general explanation
of when revolution is legitimate. By castigating his opponents for
being too theoretical, too metaphysical, while supporting the Ameri-
cans' right to resist slavery and tyranny to protect their "natural lib-
erty,"'5 2 Burke paired potentially inconsistent arguments. He
condemned political theory while defending rights and liberties, com-
ponents of political theory. But even if Burke never completely
escaped the paradox of proposing an antitheoretical theory, he cor-
rectly emphasized the dangers of excessive reliance on abstract polit-
ical/philosophical concepts.
Such ambiguity permeates Burke's works; he never totally
explained how he could distinguish dangerously abstract theory from
needed political reason, desired reform from loathesome innovation,
and deference to history from sensitivity to improvement. This uncer-
tainty, even inconsistency, can be an additional Burkean value: It
may be difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to create a determinate
structure simply out of the combined beliefs that good and evil exist
48. Id. at 311.
49. Id. at 289.
50. Id. at 268.
51. Id. at 277.
52. E. BURKE, Speech on Conciliation with America, in BURKE'S SPEECHES 82 (F. Selby
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Conciliation].
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and that they can only be recognized and treated depending upon all
the circumstances.
In 1774, Burke spoke against a revenue tax on the colonies. Once
again he had to rebut charges that his position was seditious. This
time he did not theoretically justify dissent, as he had when he criti-
cized King George III and his allies. Instead, Burke turned to another
of his formidable debating skills-scathing, even repulsive
approbation:
Thus are blown away the insect race of courtly falsehoods!
thus perish the miserable inventions of the wretched runners for a
wretched cause, which they have fly-blown into every weak and
rotten part of the country, in vain hopes that when their maggots
had taken wing, their importunate buzzing might sound something
like the public voice!53
Turning to the issue of taxation, Burke observed that, based upon
experience, "the effects" of such taxation would be to aggravate the
Americans for little profit.54 Although the tax was small, the Ameri-
cans would resist it because it was a new policy and because it was a
form of slavery." Citing Spain as an example, Burke stated that such
tyrannical policies impoverish all parties.56 In one of the few passages
complimentary of lawyers, Burke explained why the American lead-
ers, many of whom were legally trained, would not tolerate such a
tax: "This study renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in
attack, ready in defence, full of resources.... They augur misgovern-
ment at a distance; and sniff the approach of tyranny in every tainted
breeze."57 To the argument that England had the right to tax
America for revenue, Burke replied: "I am not here going into the
distinction of rights, not attempting to mark their boundaries. I do
not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of
them.""
The following year Burke again failed to persuade Parliament to
make peace with the colonies. The issue could not be resolved legalis-
tically: "It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic, to apply the ordi-
nary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not
know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole peo-
53. E. BURKE, Speech on American Taxation, in BURKE'S SPEECHES 47 (F. Selby ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Taxation].
54. Id. at 2, 4.
55. Id. at 13, 60.
56. Id. at 62.
57. E. BURKE, Conciliation, supra note 52, at 84.
58. E. BURKE, Taxation, supra note 53, at 58.
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pie."59  He repeated his admonition against governing America
"according to our own imaginations ... [or] ... according to abstract
ideas of right,"'6 but he also proposed some "principles of colony gov-
ernment."61 The first rule of empire should be compromise: "As we
must give away some natural liberty, to enjoy civil advantages; so we
must sacrifice some civil liberties, for the advantages to be derived
from the communion and fellowship of a great empire."62
Burke argued that the proposals to experiment with new taxes or
to resort to military force were ill advised because they ignored the
true interests of the Americans.63 Enforcement will be impossible
because of the ocean: "You cannot pump this dry."'6 4 But the great-
est cost may be to England itself:
For, in order to prove that the Americans have no right to
their liberties, we are every day endeavouring to subvert the max-
ims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the
Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate the
value of freedom itself ... 65
Burke's favorite themes reappeared when he explained why he
continued to support the Americans, even after they revolted. His
moderation to the rebels was not treason.66 The colonists were claim-
ing the right to revolt, a right common to all men: "For I never knew
a writer on the theory of government so partial to authority as not to
allow, that the hostile mind of the rulers to their people did fully jus-
tify a change of government . ,"67 Burke observed that the people
have delegated their power to the government, which is designed to
further their happiness; thus, they can best decide if it has failed in its
duty.6" Burke again bemoaned the costs to English liberty caused by
the government's attempts at suppression: "Liberty, if I understand it
at all, is a general principle, and the clear right of all subjects within
the realm, or of none. Partial freedom seems to me a most invidious
mode of slavery.... Indeed, nothing is security to any individual but
59. E. BURKE, Conciliation, supra note 52, at 93.
60. Id. at 70.
61. Id. at 66.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 92.
65. Id. at 88.
66. E. BURKE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in BURKE'S SPEECHES 153 (F. Selby ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Letter].
67. Id. at 154. Burke also expressed sympathy for Irish revolutionary motivations. I.
KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 179.
68. E. BURKE, Letter, supra note 66, at 167.
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the common interest of all."
'69
Burke proudly accepted the accusation that he was a "party
man."7 He used this charge of partisanship, of bad motivation, to
explore human nature, which he believed was a mixture of good and
evil. The Hobbesian viewpoint was excessive: "Am I not to avail
myself of whatever good is to be found in the world, because of the
mixture of evil that will always be in it?" 7' Indeed, such pessimists
should look in the mirror: "A conscientious person would rather
doubt his own judgment, than condemn his species .... But he that
accuses all mankind of corruption, ought to remember that he is sure
to convict only one.' 72 This Hobbesian "moral levelling" is a "servile
principle": it denies the desirability of reform because evil remains
constant.73 Cynical views are particularly dangerous during a time of
troubles, destroying the English commitment to both liberty and
equality: "Liberty is in danger of being made unpopular to English-
men. Contending for an imaginary power, we begin to acquire the
spirit of domination, and to lose the relish of honest equality."74
E. Burke the Anti-Revolutionary
One ironic reason for Burke's early opposition to the French
Revolution may have been his previous support of the American
Revolution. Those successful revolutionaries believed Burke was a
complete ally. Burke became friends with Thomas Paine in 1788
when Paine toured England and France promoting an iron bridge
Paine had designed; Paine stayed a week at Burke's Beaconsfield man-
sion.75 When the American Ambassador John Adams returned
home, Paine became an unofficial ambassador for the United States,76
maintaining a close correspondence with such leaders as Jefferson,
Franklin, Madison, Jay, and Adams.77 Burke became anxious about
Paine's expressed hopes for revolution in France. This anxiety turned
69. Id. at 142-43.
70. Id. at 176.
71. Id. at 178.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id: at 180-81. Burke saw legal equality as one crucial aspect of freedom: "There is no
equality among us; we are not fellow-citizens, if the mariner, who lands on the quay, does not
rest on as firm legal ground as the merchant who sits in his counting-house." Id. at 144.
Liberty and equality thus are not in contradiction: "Liberty, if I understand it at all, is a
general principle .... " Id. at 142.
75. T. COPELAND, Burke, Paine, and Jefferson, in OUR EMINENT FRIEND EDMUND
BURKE 153, 157 (1949).
76. Id. at 159.
77. Id.
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to alarm when Paine showed Burke a letter from Thomas Jefferson
containing the following passage, a passage endorsing total revolution
based upon political abstractions:
Every government should have for it's [sic] only end the pres-
ervation of the rights of man: whence it follows that to recall con-
stantly the government to ... the end proposed, the constitution
should begin by a Declaration of the natural and imprescriptible
rights of man.7"
When the French Revolution erupted in 1789, Burke reacted
quickly. He terminated correspondence with Paine at approximately
the same time as he made his first public speech against the revolu-
tion-February 9, 1790:
Instead of redressing grievances, and improving the fabric of
their state . . . [t]hey first destroyed all the balances and
counterpoises which serve to fix the state and to give it a steady
direction, and which furnish sure correctives to any violent spirit
which may prevail in any of the orders. These balances existed in
their oldest constitution, and in the constitution of this country
.... These they rashly destroyed, and then they melted down the
whole into one incongrous, ill-connected mass.7 9
Because Burke conceded the right to revolt and was reluctant to
"indict a people," he concluded that the revolution was unjustified
because it was led by evil people with evil designs. Nevertheless, com-
pared to his later writings about the Revolution, he was relatively
even tempered when he attacked the Jacobins in his most famous
work, Reflections on the Revolution in France.s0 Burke subsequently
cast the Jacobins as ghouls:
[O]ut of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France has
arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more terrific
guise than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination,
and subdued the fortitude of man. Going straight forward to its
end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorse, despising all com-
mon maxims and all common means, that hideous phantom over-
powered those who could not believe it was possible she could at
78. Id. at 188.
79. E. BURKE, Speech on the Army Estimates, in 3 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE 221 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this speech on Feb. 9,
1790.).
80. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (T. Mahoney ed. 1982)
(1st ed. n.p. 1790) [hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS]. Burke's rage against the
Jacobins loosened his customary attention to facts. He exaggerated how the revolutionaries
mistreated Marie Antoinnette. I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 152. Even at this stage, he
equated Jacobinism with evil irrationality. Their riot was "a drunken delirium from the hot
spirit drawn out of the alembic of hell." Id. at 182.
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all exist . . ..
Although Reflections permanently catapulted Burke to interna-
tional fame and quickly altered British public opinion about the
Revolution from acceptance to fear, it contained few new ideas.
Burke explained how the French Revolution differed from the Glori-
ous Revolution of 1688, which as a Whig, Burke supported. In the
Glorious Revolution revolution, the Whigs threw out King James II
to preserve their ancient constitution and to protect their ancient
rights and liberties which James had violated.82 But those Whig
rebels had not established the principle that government could be
changed by any passing majority. Past generations could bind the
future because society's contract is a covenant between past, present,
and future generations.83
Burke argued that the Jacobins' false version of equality under-
cut social stability:
You would have had a protected, satisfied, laborious, and obe-
dient people, taught to seek and to recognize the happiness that is
to be found by virtue in all conditions; in which consists the true
moral equality of mankind, and not in that monstrous fiction [lev-
elling] which, by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into
men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves
only to aggravate and embitter the real inequality which it never
can remove.
84
Burke predictably found such levelling to be dangerously abstract, but
he did not conclude that the concept of equality was either vacuous
85
or totally dangerous: "The pretended rights of these theorists are all
extremes; and in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are
morally and politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of middle,
81. E. BURKE, Three Letters to a Member of Parliament on the Proposals for Peace with the
Regicide Directory of France. Letter I. On the Overtures of Peace, in 5 THE WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 237 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke wrote these letters in
1796.) [hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Regicide Directory].
82. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 80, at 35, 37. Burke argued that he was not
being inconsistent in opposing the French Revolution while accepting the 1688 Revolution,
nor was he hostile to contractarianism as Bickel or Bork had assumed. See supra note 8. He
justified the Glorious Revolution by stating: "I assert, that the foundations laid down by the
Commons . . . for justifying the Revolution of 1688, are the very same laid down in Mr.
Burke's Reflections,-that is to say, a breach of the original contract, implied and expressed in
the Constitution of this country .. " E. BURKE, Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 4
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 121 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke
wrote this statement in 1791.) [hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Whigs]. The Whigs had invoked
the contractual defense of necessity to justify their civil war. Id.
83. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 80, at 22, 110.
84. Id. at 42.
85. See, e.g., Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
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incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned. ' 86 Thus,
men of great merit are needed to determine the proper scope of rights:
The rights of men in governments are their advantages; and these
are often in balances between differences of good, in compromises
sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and
evil. Political reason is a computing principle: adding, sub-
tracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally and not metaphysi-
cally, or mathematically, true moral denominations.8 7
Although Burke argued that the revolutionaries' destruction of
the French economy typified their political wrongheadedness, he did
not believe that economics should be the center of his political
calculus. The economists were members of the opposition: "But the
age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calcula-
tors has succeeded . .8.8. Excessive reliance on markets will only
concentrate power in the hands of the sophisticated, urban specula-
tors: "Your legislators, in everything new, are the very first who have
"189founded a commonwealth upon gaming ....
By putting all power in the National Assembly, the French vio-
lated the tenets of mixed government. To dramatize the evil devalua-
tion of the monarchy, Burke invented facts to describe how the
radicals mishandled Queen Marie Antionnette. He also defended the
church and the aristocracy. Their crucial right was the right to prop-
erty, which is the basis of the true rights of men. 90 The government
had no legitimate power to confiscate property; it could only regulate
property. 91
To refute the revolutionaries' claim that all legitimacy is found in
pure democratic rule, Burke revived arguments first made in A Vindi-
cation of Natural Society92 thirty-four years before:
But where popular authority is absolute and unrestrained, the peo-
ple have an infinitely greater, because a far better founded, confi-
dence in their own power. . . . Besides, they are less under
responsibility to one of the greatest controlling powers on earth,
the sense of fame and estimation .... A perfect democracy is,
therefore, the most shameless thing in the world. As it is the most
shameless, it is the most fearless. 93
86. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 80, at 70-71.
87. Id. at 71.
88. Id. at 86.
89. Id. at 226.
90. Id. at 115, 120-23.
91. Id. at 115.
92. E. BURKE, VINDICATION, supra note 26.
93. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 80, at 106-07.
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Citing Aristotle, Burke showed how majority tyranny, by its very
nature, can be far more venal than any despotic regime:
Aristotle observes that a democracy has many striking points of
resemblance with a tyranny. Of this I am certain, that in a democ-
racy the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most
cruel oppression upon the minority whenever strong divisions pre-
94vail in that kind of policy, as they often must ....
By making even the judiciary elective, the French have removed all
"balances and correctives to the evils of a light and unjust democ-
racy.... Such an independent judiciary was ten times more necessary
when a democracy became the absolute power of the country."95 The
Jacobins thus also created judicial tyranny:
However, if great care is not taken to form it in a spirit very differ-
ent from that which has guided them in their proceedings relative
to state offenses, this tribunal, subservient to their inquisition, The
Committee of Research, will extinguish the last sparks of liberty in
France and settle the most dreadful and arbitrary tyranny ever
known in any nation.96
The revolutionaries' fundamental error was in not properly
understanding human nature. They ignored how moral sentiments
bind a society.97 They exaggerated the importance of self-interest, 98
and "by hating vices too much, they [came] to love men too little." 99
In seeking to eliminate evil, they denied the plastic nature of power
and the fallible nature of man-men would eventually seize and use
power, and unchecked power would become tyrannical power. Such
insensitivity to the validity of existing institutions also revealed their
egotism; they selfishly sought innovation instead of proposing gradual
reform. too
Burke's warnings cost him politically. In a dramatic Parliamen-
tary session, Whig leader Charles Fox tearfully forced Burke to
"retire" from the Whig party. In An Appeal From the New to the Old
Whigs, 0 1 Burke defended himself by arguing that he was furthering
94. Id. at 143-44.
95. Id. at 243.
96. Id. at 246-47.
97. Id. at 74.
98. Id. at 88.
99. Id. at 199.
100. Id. at 37-38. Burke observed that this theory ultimately generated dangerous feelings:
"[W]hat... [the Jacobins] ... held out as a large and liberal toleration is in reality a cruel and
insidious religious persecution, infinitely more bitter than any which had been heard of within
this century." E. BURKE, Whigs, supra note 82, at 72.
101. E. BURKE, Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 4 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
OF EDMUND BURKE 121 (Beaconsfield Edition 1901).
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the Whig tradition of mixed government. His complaints against the
French became a litany. Fascinated by novelty and abstraction, the
Jacobins had put theory above feelings, 10 2 yet they tried to make their
constitution forever binding. 103
Burke rejected the charge that he had been inconsistent because
he had supported the revolution in America and the Glorious Revolu-
tion in England, and had opposed the excesses of King George III.
He first observed that an advocate of mixed government will use dif-
ferent arguments depending upon which branch is threatening which
other branch; there are different principles for each branch.l" Thus
Burke could justify the Glorious Revolution of 1688 because it was a
limited revolution to remedy a tyrannical king's breach of contract-
"necessity" forced the Whigs to use extreme measures to return the
social contract to its ancient origins.105 The victorious Whig revolu-
tionaries then appropriately bound future generations to that revived
constitution: "The Revolution did not introduce any innovation ....
The whole frame of the government was restored entire and unhurt."'
6
The French Revolution, however, was unjustified because the people
cannot change their government at will; one cannot expect the posi-
tive law to authorize its own destruction. 107 Burke's distinction
between the two revolutions is not reducible to a theorem. He made
an overall assessment of the need for revolt, the motive for revolt, and
the effects of that revolution on such institutions as property, the
Church, the economy, and the form of government.
Just as Burke would limit the people's power to revolt to times of
necessity, he also would constrain majoritarian powers during less
trying times: "And the votes of a majority of the people, whatever
their infamous flatterers may teach in order to corrupt their minds,
cannot alter the moral any more than they can alter the physical
essence of things.1"8 The people need to be checked by an aristoc-
racy, which Burke defined to include judges, traders, and professors-
a natural aristocracy. 109 Otherwise, the infinite power of the majority
will be unleashed: "Whatever he may lawfully originate he may law-
fully endeavour to accomplish." 010
102. Id. at 82-83.
103. Id. at 121.
104. Id. at 93.
105. Id. at 121.
106. Id. at 137.
107. Id. at 140.
108. Id. at 162.
109. Id. at 174-75.
110. Id. at 184.
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Burke clarified how ancient institutions combine with "just
prejudices" to protect us all: "We are afraid to put men to live and
trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that
this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do
better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations
and of ages."'' Instead of looking at all non-majoritarian structures
as usurpations," 2 Burke suggests doubting one's own wisdom, defer-
ring to the existing mixed government: "The whole scheme of our
mixed Constitution is to prevent any one of its principles from being
carried as far as, taken by itself, and theoretically, it would go."
'"13
In letter after letter, Burke assaulted the French Revolution. Its
subsequent excesses only confirmed his hatred. When England consid-
ered making peace with France in 1796, he bitterly opposed such
negotiations; one cannot make peace with a monster." 4 Burke pre-
dicted the "Republic of Regicide" was implacable and would fight
England again: "It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war." 115
Personalizing his politics, he so feared that the Jacobins would dese-
crate his grave that he directed in his will that he be buried in a secret
location: "I am not safe from them. They have tigers to fall upon
animated strength; they have hyenas to prey upon carcasses ...
Neither sex, nor age, nor the sanctuary of the tomb is sacred to
them. '""I6 The location of Burke's gravesight is still unknown.
F. Reforms and Innovations
Burke's passionate political commitment also embroiled him in
many Parliamentary controversies over governing the country and the
Empire. His intensity and flaming rhetoric were not limited to the
written word; his raging Parliamentary debates" I7 inspired his friend
Boswell to describe him as "foaming like Niagra. ' I 8 Burke justified
his attacks on governmental abuses as reform: "Reform is not a
change in the substance or in the primary modification of the object,
but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained
111. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 80, at 99.
112. E. BURKE, Whigs, supra note 82, at 206.
113. Id. at 207.
114. E. BURKE, Regicide Directory, supra note 81, at 245.
115. Id. at 250.
116. E. BURKE, Letter to a Noble Lord on the Attacks made upon Mr. Burke and his
Pension, in the House of Lords, by the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of Lauderdale, in 5 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 175 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke wrote
this letter in 1796.) [hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Noble Lord].
117. I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 181.
118. Id. at 180.
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of. '119 Even the Constitution can sometimes be improved: "Publick
troubles have often called upon the Country to look into its Constitu-
tion. It has ever been bettered by such a revision." 120 On the other
hand, Burke noted that innovation and change characterized the
''complete revolution" in France:
[Change] alters the substance of the objects themselves, and gets
rid of all their essential good as well as of all the accidental evil
annexed to them. Change is novelty; and whether it is to operate
any one of the effects of reformation at all, or whether it may not
contradict the very principle upon which reformation is desired,
cannot be certainly known beforehand.
12
1
Once again, a Burkean distinction is theoretically elusive-a distinc-
tion only partially understood in its application.
If Burke's prescient warnings about the French Revolution rep-
resented his greatest triumph, his futile attempt to impeach Warren
Hastings, head of the East India Company exemplified his obsessive
nature: "[N]either hope, nor fear, nor anger, nor weariness, nor dis-
couragement of any kind, shall move me from this trust.' 1 22 Burke
consistently argued that England's efforts to colonize India were evil.
Parliament tired of his ten-year crusade, censuring him in 1789 for his
alleged excesses in presenting the case. 123 An indication of Burke's
commitment to the Indian issue is that four out of the twelve volumes
of his published speeches and writings concern the topic. Defending
even the caste system, Burke predictably urged deference to healthy
prejudices formed by tradition:
But'God forbid we should pass judgement upon people who
framed their laws and institutions prior to our insect origins of yes-
terday. With all the faults of their nature, and errors of their insti-
tutions, the institutions, which act so powerfully upon their
natures, have two material characteristics that entitle them to
respect:- first, great force and stability; next, excellent moral and
civil effects .... They have stood firm on their ancient base-they
have cast their roots deep in their native soil.
124
Burke's acceptance of a caste system, which most would find
unjust, did not mean he totally deferred to existing social structures:
"I never mean to put any colonist, or any human creature, in a situa-
119. E. BURKE, Noble Lord, supra note 116, at 186.
120. E. BURKE, Address to the British Colonists in North America, 9 WORKS 212 (1777),
quoted in R. CANAVAN, THE POLITICAL REASON OF EDMUND BURKE 170 (1960).
121. E. BURKE, Noble Lord, supra note 116, at 186.
122. I. KRAMNICK, supra note 12, at 127.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 128.
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tion not becoming a freeman."' 25 For instance, he drafted a Sketch of
a Negro Code which would have gradually emancipated American
black slaves.' 26 Nevertheless, Burke's analysis has a circular quality:
He characterized a social system as either unjust or as a hallowed
institution, and then defended that distinction with appropriate argu-
ments. Burke's arguments both explain and rationalize the conclusion
he reached. Thus his arguments eliminate social and political
problems, but they do not provide automatic answers.
From the beginning of his political career, Burke seemed to have
been aware of his strong will and powerful beliefs (and the need to
protect them). His belief in self-expression generated several novel
political ideas. For example, in his first speech to the Bristol voters
who elected him, he stated he did not feel bound to represent their
exact views, but had a duty to apply his own judgment on behalf of all
of England.'27 Additionally, his first major political writing,
Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents,'28 was a defense of
dissenting party politics.
Burke was not the first to defend religious moderation or free
speech. John Locke wrote: "The magistrate's power extends not to
establishing of any article of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of
his laws. For laws are of no force without penalties, and penalties in
this case are absolutely impertinent; because they are not proper to
convince the mind."' 29 Milton saw truth prevailing over falsity "in a
free and open encounter."13 But it was, nevertheless, Burke who
advanced the libertarian tradition by eloquently linking free exercise
of speech and religion with the beneficial political values of modera-
tion, tolerance, and compromise. In 1773, he argued against a bill
limiting the rights of Dissenting Methodists: "Toleration is good for
all, or it is good for none."'' Such toleration is an essential part of
125. E. BURKE, Speech at His Arrival at Bristol, in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE 86 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this speech in 1774.)
[hereinafter cited as E. BURKE, Arrival].
126. E. BURKE, Letter to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas: with the Sketch of a Negro Code, in
6 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 255-91 (Beaconsfield edition 1901)
(Burke wrote this letter in 1792.).
127. E. BURKE, Arrival, supra note 125, at 86.
128. E. BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS (London
1770).
129. J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE (n.p.
1689), quoted in P. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE ANTHOLOGY 77 (1973).
130. AREOPAGITICA, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of
England (n.p. 1644), in PROSE WRITINGS 23-38 (Everyman edition 1927).
13 1. E. BURKE, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters, in 7 THE WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 29 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this
speech on Mar. 17, 1773.).
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Christianity itself.'3 2 It would be dangerous for the Church or state
to become tyrannical, forcing dissenters to become virtual slaves, "liv-
ing under will, not under law."' 3 3
Burke was horrified at proposals to introduce penal laws depriv-
ing Irish Catholics of their franchise and limiting their ability to
receive an education: "The taking away of a vote is the taking away
of the shield which the subject has, not only against the oppression of
power, but that worst of all oppressions, the persecution of private
society and private manners."' 134 Educational deprivation constitutes
another form of despotism: "Indeed, I have ever thought the prohibi-
tion of the means of improving our rational nature is the worst species
of tyranny that the insolence and perverseness of mankind ever dared
to exercise." 135 Such proposals destroy "some part of that equality
without which you can never be FELLOW-CITIZENS."'
136
Not suprisingly, the French Revolution diminished Burke's mod-
eration. Burke justified the regulation of Unitarians because their reli-
gion became a dangerous political faction: 137 "The principle of your
petitioners is no passive conscientious dissent, on account of an over-
scrupulous habit of mind: the dissent on their part is fundamental,
and goes to the very root .. ,,1. Burke also argued that overtly
political support of the Jacobins and of radical change in England
should be unprotected speech: "These insect reptiles, whilst they go
132. Id. at 25.
133. Id. at 24.
134. E. BURKE, Letter to a Peer of Ireland on the Penal Laws against Irish Catholics, in 4
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 225 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke
wrote this letter in 1782.).
135. Id. at 228.
136. Id. at 220.
137. Burke explained how he could still support religious tolerance:
If religion only related to the individual, and was a question between God and
the conscience, it would not be wise, nor in my opinion equitable, for human
authority to step in. But when religion is embodied into faction, and factions
have objects to pursue, it will and must, more or less, become a question of power
between them.
E. BURKE, Speech on a Motion for Leave to bring in a Bill to repeal and alter certain acts
respecting Religious Opinions, upon the Occasion of a Petition of the Unitarian Society, in 7 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 48 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke deliv-
ered this speech on May 11, 1792.).
In many other works, he expressed similar sentiments:
The members of this faction leave no doubt of the nature and extent of the mis-
chief they mean to produce .... They are put out of all dispute by the thanks
which, formally and as it were officially, they issue, in order to recommend and
to promote the most atrocious and treasonous libels against all the hitherto cher-
ished objects of love and veneration of this people.
E. BURKE, Whigs, supra note 82, at 69.
138. Id. at 56.
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on only caballing and toasting, only fill us with disgust; if they get
above their natural size, and increase the quantity whilst they keep
the quality of their venom, they become the objects of the greatest
terror."' 3 9 Of course, at that time in history hardly anyone disagreed
with the crime of seditious libel."4
Only one year after the Revolution began, Burke led a movement
to make the English government more efficient. Burke advocated
that: pensions should be reduced; the King should keep accurate
records; and unprofitable public lands should be put on the market
block. Burke almost sounds Jacobin in his attack on waste: "But
when the reason of old establishments is gone, it is absurd to preserve
nothing but the burden of them. This is superstitiously to embalm a
carcass not worth an ounce of the gums that are used to preserve
it."
4 '
Burke's commitment to efficiency exemplified the middle class
bias in his politics. Burke proposed that government be minimal:
The state ought to confine itself to what regards the state or the
creatures of the state: namely, the exterior establishment of its reli-
gion; its magistracy; its revenue; its military force by sea and land;
the corporations that owe their existence to its fiat; in a word,
everything that is truly and properly public.'4 2
The government should not regulate the market, which is based upon
the laws of Nature, and thus the laws of God: 143 "The moment that
government appears at market, all the principles of market will be
subverted."'" Although the rich are "trustees for those who
labor,"' 141 the poor should expect nothing from the government:
"Patience, labor, sobriety, frugality, and religion should be recom-
mended to them; all the rest is downright fraud."'46 He did not think
such views represented class hostility. 
147
Burke fought all efforts to reapportion the electorate and charac-
139. Id. at 51.
140. See, e.g., L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
141. E. BURKE, Speech on presenting to the House of Commons a Plan for the Better
Security of the Independence of Parliament, and the Economical Reformation of the Civil and
other Establishments, in 2 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 265
(Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this speech on Feb. 11, 1780.).
142. E. BURKE, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, in 5 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE 166 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke wrote this article in 1795.).
143. Id. at 157.
144. Id. at 154.
145. Id. at 134.
146. Id. at 135.
147. Burke used the theory of virtual representation to justify uneven apportionment.
Under that theory, an enlightened minority elected by a larger minority could best protect the
country. G. SABINE, supra note 12, at 610.
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terized such proposals as innovations. He created a presumption in
favor of existing institutions: "To those who say it is a bad one, I
answer, look at the effects. In all moral machinery, the moral results
are its test."' 148 Burke then claimed that the government treated all
the regions equally. 149 Instead of applying his usual anti-metaphysi-
cal approach, Burke acknowledged the need for political theory: "I
do not vilify theory and speculation: no, because that would be to
vilify reason itself."5 0
Despite his triumphs, Burke's last years were filled with despon-
dency. Both his wife and son died and he felt he had sacrificed them
to his career. He also was embittered because he was never made a
Lord; the nobility obviously viewed his service to and defense of aris-
tocratic values as insufficent. These frustrations exploded when sev-
eral Lords fought a pension proposed for him. Burke's Letter to a
Noble Lord 'I' contained a painful collection of brilliant observations
and cruel counterattacks: "I have strained every nerve to keep the
Duke of Bedford in that situation which alone makes him my supe-
rior."' 52 Burke belittled the Duke's appearance:
The Duke of Bedford is the leviathan among all the creatures of
the crown. He tumbles about his unwieldy bulk, he plays and frol-
lics in the ocean of the royal bounty. Huge as he is ... he is still a
creature. His ribs, his whalebone, his blubber, the very spiracles
through which he spouts a torrent of brine against his origin, and
covers me all over with the spray, everything of him and about him
is of the throne.
153
Burke sounded like a Jacobin when he used Enlightenment the-
ory to remind the Duke that his heritage had illegitimate origins: the
Duke's ancestors had received their fortune from Henry VIII, "a lev-
elling tyrant,"'5 4 for making a dishonorable peace treaty with
France. 55 Burke even invoked his son's death, reminding the Duke
that he had progeny while Burke was only an "old oak."'' 56 Burke
suggested the Duke should follow the example of Lord Keppel, who
148. E. BURKE, Speech on a Motion for a Committee to inquire into the State of the
Representation of the Commons in Parliament, in 7 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
EDMUND BURKE 96 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this speech on May 7,
1782.).
149. Id. at 99.
150. Id. at 97.
151. E. BURKE, Noble Lord, supra note 116, at 175.
152. Id. at 196-97.
153. Id. at 199.
154. Id. at 202.
155. Id. at 204.
156. Id. at 208.
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energetically preserved aristocratic values by expanding the aristoc-
racy: "He valued ancient nobility; and he was not disinclined to aug-
ment it with new honors. He valued the old nobility and the new, not
as an excuse for inglorious sloth, but as an incitement to virtuous
activity."' 57 If aristocrats become too decadent, they will not fulfill
their constitutional obligation to check the levity of the crown and the
multitude. 158
III. SUMMARY AND TRANSITION
Burke's views have been arranged like pieces on a chessboard
after the opening series of moves. A variety of approaches, varying in
risk, suggest themselves. One could sweep the board clean, conclud-
ing that Burke is so incoherent or ambivalent that his views provide
no contemporary value. Or Burke could be dismissed because his
politics clearly clash with the views of such founders of our country as
Paine or Jefferson. Because Burke contested "innovation" while
accepting "reform" and certain limited "revolutions," any clever law-
yer could use the "If He Were Alive Today" argument to support
virtually any policy. That gambit could use Burke's views on the
issue of judicial review to reach opposite conclusions. A proponent of
judicial activism can claim that Burke would accept judicial review as
a healthy American institutional tradition. An opponent could use
Burke's own words against judicial activism. Because only legislatures
can make and rescind rights,
[a] judge, a person exercising a judicial capacity, is neither to apply
to original justice nor to a discretionary application of it. He goes
to justice and discretion only at second hand, and through the
medium of some superiors. He is to work neither upon his opinion
of the one nor of the other, but upon a fixed rule, of which he has
not the making, but singly and solely the application to the case.159
Many modem conservatives are guilty of the intellectual sins
Burke most dreaded. They have created abstract theories of judicial
review and of politics that are based upon a constricted view of
human nature, a hostility to institutions that have not historically
reflected their particular beliefs, an insensitivity to the values of a
mixed government, and a limited, metaphysical definition of liberty
and equality. Furthermore, by dwelling upon the relative legitimacy
157. Id. at 224.
158. Id. at 225.
159. E. BURKE, Speech relative to the Middlesex Election, in 7 THE WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 64 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this speech on
Feb. 7, 1771.).
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of such structures as courts, markets, and elections, they have
improperly tolerated or proposed certain tyrannical acts. Thus, they
have deviated from the essence of Burke's conservatism: a vigilant
hostility to injustice.
In discussing the above proposition, one must assume that the
courts, particularly the tenured federal courts, play the equivalent of
the "aristocratic" role in Burke's mixed government. This assump-
tion is not arbitrary. It is not necessary to deny that the people retain
ultimate sovereignty to argue that the plastic powers characteristic of
aristocracy and monarchy have reappeared in the courts and the pres-
idency. The framers, who like Burke were inspired by Montesquieu,
believed that by separating powers, they were creating a structure
resembling mixed government.
60
The word "aristocracy" takes on understandably negative conno-
tations in our culture; one imagines a group of rich people who have
inherited their wealth and only wish to ossify the status quo. But a
160. According to Gary Wills, Madison considered Montesquieu "the oracle" of separated
powers, but Montesquieu was not completely useful because he also was discussing mixed
government. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 180 (1981). For instance,
Montesquieu considered the judicial branch a nonentity. Id. at 121. Madison rejected the
mixed government idea because all power under the American structure represents the people.
Id. at 120. The "republican genius" of the Constitution prevailed over the other forms of
government: "Monarchial and aristocratic principles were not to be introduced in the
American scheme, even as partial or balancing factors." Id. at 104.
This article does not try to argue that the Constitution is a mixed government deriving its
sovereignty from the one, the few, and the many. Id. at 120. The Constitution, however,
operates on a day to day basis as if it were a mixed government, even though sovereignty
ultimately remains with the people. Thus, the works of both Montesquieu and Burke are
relevant, even if they were primarily thinking of mixed governments and intermingling that
theory with the doctrine of separation of powers.
Montesquieu heavily influenced Burke:
Above all, both Burke and Montesquieu revered the British Constitution, which
the revolutionaries considered a monument of superstition and ignorance. It is
chiefly as the defender of the British Constitution that Burke, at this time,
admires Montesquieu. Montesquieu had spent twenty years writing the Esprit
des lois, and his considered judgment was that the British Constitution was the
greatest monument to liberty.
C. COURTNEY, MONTESQUIEU AND BURKE 183 (1963).
Sabine argues that Burke's use of Montesquieu was window-dressing:
For rhetorical purposes he was not above using the weight of Montesquieu's
authority, but in fact his idea of constitutional balance had little to do with the
separation of powers which liberals regard as the bulwark of individual liberties.
For Burke the balance is between the great vested interests of the realm and its
ground is simply prescription, not at all the inviolability of individual rights. He
agreed substantially with Hume that the arrangements of a political society are
conventions sanctified by use and wont.
G. SABINE, supra note 12, at 608. Sabine emphasizes Burke's conservatism and consistency,
although Professor Kramnick's theory of ambivalence is perhaps more persuasive. Otherwise,
Burke could not have supported so many revolutions and reforms.
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"meritocracy" can replace an "aristocracy." Burke considered the
"natural aristocracy" to be at least the equal of the titled gentry. He
was not a member of the nobility- nor did he believe in total rigidity.
As De Tocqueville observed, American lawyers constitute a peculiar
aristocracy. 161 And the federal judges, lawyers who can create law
without fear of loss of job or income, have all the characteristics of
Burke's aristocrats except personal wealth and inheritable title. They
have the power to ameliorate abuses by the people or the executive,
and yet they also have the power to create arrogant, disorderly
tyranny.
Turning now to the scholarly work of the five judges, the article
shall retain a Burkean tone by discussing how these judges apply their
jurisprudence to several contemporary issues. Those discussions will
focus on a specific legal issue and an underlying theoretical difference
between the judge and Burke. For example, the article compares
Burke's and Bork's views on political dissent not only to evaluate that
particular issue, but also to assess how abstractly theoretical they
were in reaching their conclusions. The judge and Burke may agree
on the solution to a specific problem, but they will differ radically on
how they reached that conclusion.
A. Judge Bork's Abstract Political Theory
Equality of preferences has been a consistent theme in Judge
Bork's constitutional theorizing. In his most influential work, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, Bork assumes "there
is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any
other."' 62 Thus the Court, whose legitimate authority is suspect
because it is not a majoritarian institution, should remain "controlled
by principles exterior to the will of the Justices."' 63 The Warren
Court, according to Bork, violated the judge's duty by including
moral intuitions-a sense of fairness-in its constitutional calculus:
"The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair
161. In his discussions of how majority tyranny is mitigated in America, De Tocqueville
found that the lawyers were a partial check:
Some of the tastes and habits of the aristocracy may consequently be
discovered in the characters of lawyers. They participate in the same instinctive
love of order and formalities; and they entertain the same repugnance to the
actions of the multitude, and the same secret contempt of the government of the
people.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284 (P. Bradley ed. 1945) (1st ed. Paris
1835).
162. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bork, Neutral Principles].
163. Id. at 6.
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implications, and not construct new rights."1' 4 Bork implies that
there is no difference between political preferences and personal pref-
erences: a judge interested in autonomy or equality is no different
from a judge who wants another milkshake. In other words, there is
no legal difference between having a political/moral viewpoint and
being personally biased.
At his Senate confirmation hearing, Bork again used the concept
of legitimacy to limit the types of arguments judges can use: "I do not
know any way to apply the Constitution that I regard as legitimate
other than in terms of the intent of the framers, as best as that can be
determined." 6 ' Legitimacy, of course, is a potent theoretical noun: it
creates a test which, if not met, leads to the conclusion that the chal-
lenged act is not only ill-advised, but completely wrong, even uncon-
stitutional. According to Bork, if a judge does not base his or her
opinion upon the framers' intent and the governmental structure
implied by the framers' law, the judge is engaging in "judicial
imperialism."'
166
In a recent speech made after his appointment, Judge Bork found
fault with contemporary first amendment theory for imposing the
same moral relativism that he had previously used to justify judicial
deference. Although the judges should be amoralist in their jurispru-
dential assumptions, Bork accuses them of erring by making amoral-
ism part of first amendment theory: "Moral harm is not to be
counted, but to do so would interfere with the autonomy of the indi-
vidual. The result of discounting moral harm is the privatization of
morality. The law of the community is thus required to practice
moral relativism."'' 67 Only judges must be pure relativists, remaining
morally indifferent and inactive until required to implement whatever
values legislatures or constitutions generate: "In a constitutional
democracy the moral content of law must be derived from the moral-
ity of the framer and the legislator, not that of the judge .... That
abstinence from giving his own desires free play, that continuing and
self-conscious renunciation of power, that is the morality of the
jurist."'
168
Bork's speech is permeated with Burkean concepts and imagery.
Bork's opponents are excessively abstract. They disrespect existing
164. Id. at 8.
165. The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982) (statement of Robert Bork, nominee)
[hereinafter cited as Confirmation Hearings-Bork].
166. Id. at 5.
167. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 11.
168. Id. at 12.
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institutions and ignore how those institutions gradually change while
maintaining "wholesome inconsistencies." Bork refers to Burke's byte
noire, the French Revolution, to exemplify the costs of excessive
"rights talk": t69 "[T]he outcome for liberty was much less happy
under the regime of 'the rights of man.' "70 Bork also echoes Burke's
distaste for "new rights" and for judicial activism.
Judge Bork is not being logically inconsistent in making moral
relativism a basic assumption, and then arguing that moral relativism
should bind judges by prohibiting expression of their beliefs, including
relativism, while the legislature can express its preferences any way it
feels. Different governmental institutions have different political/
moral responsibilities. The mix and weight of moral assumptions will
vary for each institution. Consequently, the debate is over the proper
content of that mixture.
Bork, however, is not thinking in a very Burkean fashion when
he bemoans the lack of constitutional theory: "This theoretical emp-
tiness at its center makes law, particularly constitutional law, unsta-
ble, a ship with a great deal of sail but a very shallow keel, vulnerable
to the wind of intellectual or moral fashion, which it then validates as
the commands of our most basic compact."'' Perhaps Bork's anxi-
ety over the lack of a constitutional theory explains why his assault on
"judicial imperialism" is at least as abstract as the one he claims
underlies contemporary liberalism. His theory of judging-total posi-
tivism based upon abstract assumptions about morality, majoritarian-
ism, and separation of powers---conflicts with the historical practice
of the Supreme Court. Since the days of Chief Justice Marshall,
moral concepts such as Natural Law have influenced judges' constitu-
tional decisions. 72 Bork apparently has forgotten that the Court also
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Bork had argued previously that his neutral principles would provide a theory of
the first amendment. He does not adopt Harry Kalven Jr.'s acceptance of ambiguity:
If my puzzle as to the First Amendment is not a true puzzle, it can only be for
the congenial reason that free speech is so close to the heart of democratic
organization that if we do not have an appropriate theory for our law here, we
feel we really do not understand the society in which we live.
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 162, at 20 (quoting H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE
FiRST AMENDMENT 6 (1965)).
172. Justice Bushrod Washington provides the most famous example:
The privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States . . . [are those]
which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments . . . . What these fundamental principles are, it would be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the government; ... with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
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embodies "wholesome inconsistencies that are completely at odds
with abstract generalizations about the just society."' 7 3 He has dis-
counted completely the Court's history of moral leadership, particu-
larly when confronting such fundamental problems as segregation,
and the Court's deterrent power in preventing temporary majorities
from oppressing minorities. Under Bork's theory, which emphasizes
the Framers' specific intentions, segregation would still be legal if one
accepts historian Raoul Berger's massive historical evidence that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment opposed desegregation, particu-
larly in the schools. 74 His refusal to read the text of the Constitution
compassionately means that if there were no fourteenth amendment,
apartheid would be constitutional. If there were no thirteenth amend-
ment, one could own slaves. Pre-Civil War justice should not be con-
demned for supporting slavery; the text of the Constitution tolerated
slavery.' 75 Equally important, Bork seems to imply that the Court is
unable to fight new forms of tyranny, which the framers could not
have contemplated. Imagine how he would decide a case where the
government put all citizens with intelligence quotas of less than eighty
in "re-education centers." For Bork, legal tyranny is not an oxymo-
ron. Indeed, Bork would probably reject the Burkean idea that tyr-
anny is the crucial concern of constitutional law because that mode of
analysis forces the judge to make an evaluation about good and evil
human behavior.
Contrasting how the two men justified their theory of appropri-
ate dissent reveals Bork's dislike of mixed government. His commit-
ment to abstract rigid theories of judging and of legitimacy creates an
happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government
may proscribe for the general good of the whole.
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, held that the Georgia legisla-
ture could not rescind previously tainted land grants because the legislature was "restrained,
either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by the particular
provisions of the constitution of the United States." 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
173. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 12.
174. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977). Bork does not
hedge about the primacy of history: "If the legislative history revealed a consensus about
segregation in schooling and all the other relations in life, I do not see how the Court could
escape the choices revealed and substitute its own, even though the words are general and
conditions have changed." Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 162, at 13. Bork may have
been creating a pseudo standard if he was serious about demanding consensus since there will
always be some dispute about the meaning of a proposed amendment among both its
supporters and detractors. If only consensus is a constraint, then there is no constraint at all.
But if Bork meant something less than perfect consensus, he has to confront Raoul Berger's
troubling history.
175. See, e.g., R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (antislavery judges struggle with
Fugitive Slave Acts).
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environment conducive to tyranny. While Burke defends tolerance as
a Christian policy and as a necessity for good government, Judge
Bork tries to remove not only all moral arguments, but also policy
arguments from constitutional law: "No, I do not think that is a pol-
icy ground, Senator. I think that is a constitutional argument.'
'1 76
Bork's initial definition of the scope of first amendment protec-
tion made suprisingly little use of history, the text, or the framers'
intentions. Judge Bork ignored two textual problems when he pro-
posed that the first amendment protects only purely political speech
and not other forms of expression. Arguably, the first amendment
does not have such a broad scope because it textually limited congres-
sional actions, not state actions. But more importantly, the first
amendment states that "no law" shall limit speech-without narrow-
ing that protection to political speech.' 77 Because Bork does not dis-
pute Leonard Levy's findings that the framers had a very limited
conception of free speech,178 he finds broader protection under the
structure of the Constitution: "Freedom for political speech could and
should be inferred even if there were no first amendment."' 79 Thus
Bork is willing to create a "new right," and then use that right to limit
the textual right. All other forms of expression can be completely
regulated because they "raise only issues of human gratification."''8 0
Bork relies upon neither history nor text in defining protected
political speech, but utilizes a nonhistorical, nontextual source when
he partially adopts Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney
v. California. ' 8' But, he excises Justice Brandeis's concern for individ-
ual self-fulfillment because that value clashes with his own allegedly
neutral theory that excludes all preferences because all preferences are
equal. Only the state's preferences matter to the Court. Thus, Bork's
abstract theory of preference neutrality virtually eliminates individual
rights. Only nonrevolutionary political speech is protected, solely
because it helps the democratic state function. Bork has subsequently
changed his views to include constitutional protection of "[florms of
discourse, such as moral and scientific debate, [which] are central to
democratic government .... For another example, the individual
176. Confirmation Hearings-Bork, supra note 165, at 7.
177. U. S. CONST. amend. I.
178. See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
179. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 162, at 23.
180. Id. at 26.
181. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
182. Bork, Judge Bork Replies, 70 A.B.A. J. 132 (Feb. 1984). Bork still maintains that
obscenity and pornography should not be protected because they are not essential to
democratic government. Id.
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has the right to participate in the political process by voting, but the
majority can alter even that vote because he did not neutrally define
the principle of "one person/one vote."183 The individual can express
any preference through that vote, including sadism, so long as his or
her legislators do not allow that sadism to take forms which the fram-
ers previously proscribed.
Bork accepts Justice Brandeis's arguments that the first amend-
ment serves as a safety valve and as a tool to discover and spread
political truth."8 4 Despite its explicit language and its location within
the Bill of Rights, Bork suggests that the first amendment actually
represents a governmental power. Bork quotes Professor Meiklejohn
approvingly to support the thesis that only political speech is pro-
tected speech:
The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak."
It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communi-
cation by which we "govern." It is concerned, not with a private
right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.' 8 5
Bork is now willing to distinguish between political values and per-
sonal preferences. The first amendment protects public expression of
the former, but not the latter.
Even Bork's definition of political speech is a grudging one.
Speech advocating violent overthrow of the government is unpro-
tected because "it is not aimed at a new definition of political truth by
a legislative majority."'' 8 6 Nor should the first amendment protect the
advocacy of any law violation because "[tihe process of the 'discovery
and spread of political truth' is damaged or destroyed if the outcome
is defeated by a minority that makes law enforcement, and hence the
putting of political truth into practice, impossible or less effective."'
' 8 7
The only truth is the majority's truth. Civil disobedience cannot be
discussed. Bork then argues that Justice Brandeis erred in providing
too much protection to dissent by protecting teaching as well as advo-
cacy. Bork concludes by partially adopting the position of the
Whitney majority that Brandeis did not join: "Justice Sanford's defer-
ential approach and his rejection of the 'clear and present danger test'
have never been discredited, or even met."
188
In terms of doctrine, Burke and Judge Bork do not differ greatly
183. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 162, at 18.
184. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
185. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 162, at 26 (quoting Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255).
186. Id. at 31.
187. Id. (quoting Justice Brandeis in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375).
188. Id. at 35.
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about regulating political dissent, particularly after Burke became
enraged by the French Revolution. Both men have stated that there
are limits to political speech. While pleading for religious toleration,
Burke also emphatically attacked those who questioned the basic
political and religious assumptions of English society: "[T]he infidels,
are outlaws of the constitution, not of this country, but of the human
race. They are never, never to be supported, never to be tolerated."' 18 9
Although he eloquently defended conscientious dissent many times
and was far more accepting of political and religious differences than
most of his peers, Burke believed that those who supported the
Jacobins were guilty of seditious libel. Burke never argued that all
other forms of expression could be regulated, for example, that the
government could prevent the sale of all French art. Furthermore,
Burke was extremely tolerant, given the beliefs of his time.
Nonetheless, the two men reached their conclusions using mark-
edly different methods. Bork based his first amendment theory upon
a moral desert that Burke would find repugnant; Burke certainly felt
capable of distinguishing between preferences, between good and evil.
Political leaders should not be moral eunuchs. Although he believed
that the people retain ultimate sovereignty, Burke dreaded majority
tyranny far more than does Bork. Burke constantly defended the
checks and balances of a mixed government, while Bork's rigid theory
places almost all legitimate substantive power with the legislature and
little with the Court. Rather than evaluating specific actions of the
Court for their effects, Bork has created a theory of judicial review
that never allows the use of judicial review to fight new forms of tyr-
anny. It is a theory based upon the individual's right to participate in
the political process to the degree that process allows participation.
Burke also seemed more tolerant of dissent; only the most total forms
of opposition, such as Jacobinism or atheism, were so repugnant as to
justify suppression.
Burke frequently defined tyranny in terms of specific actors and
actions. In his first book, he cited Plutarch's Lives for an example of
how tyranny is formed.' 9° After killing his best friend during a
drunken rage, Alexander the Great asked a philosopher for advice.
The philosopher said, "let a Sovereign do what he will, all his actions
are just and lawful, because they are his."' 9 1 Bork revives the ancient
evil of positivism when, like one of Burke's "courtly philosophers," he
189. E. BURKE, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant Dissenters, in 7 THE WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 36 (Beaconsfield edition 1901) (Burke delivered this
speech on Mar. 17, 1773.). Burke's tolerance did not extend to atheism. Id. at 35-36.
190. E. BURKE, VINDICATION, supra note 26, at 47.
191. Id.
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advises the legislature to flex its preferences while requiring the Court
to remain neutral, unless the narrowly construed Constitution is vio-
lated. There is a difference between the view that the people ulti-
mately should be sovereign and the belief that legislative majorities
should be the predominant source of legitimate authority.
Bork has not consistently followed his abstract theory of judicial
review. In a workshop in 1983, he seemed to place his economic
beliefs above the positive law: "[I]t is entirely proper that the law
changes as economic understanding progresses; ...once we know
what is going on, there is no reason why we should keep doing harm
rather than good."'1 92 But once he admits the justice of economics, no
neutral principle exists to prevent other judges from considering other
forms of morality. One of the ironies of Burkean analysis is that one
is relieved to find inconsistencies, which usually are considered the
worst sins of legal analysis. Bork, however, should have turned to a
deeper vision of justice than economism.
B. Judge Posner's Constricted View of Human Nature
While Bork premises his constitutional jurisprudence upon the
assumption that legislatures are to evaluate equally all preferences,
Judge Richard Posner has championed the "law and economics" the-
ory that the legislature should design laws to promote economic effi-
ciency, which maximizes preferences.' 93 In such nonconstitutional
192. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1983, at D2, col. 1. The relevant part of the reporter's article
follows:
Last week, at a daylong workshop sponsored by the Conference Board, a
business research organization, Judge Bork, who sits on the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, made it plain that he felt free to apply
his economic theories, whatever the law says.
Take his views on the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price
discrimination. "If the new economics is right, there is never a case in which
price discrimination injures competition," Judge Bork said. "In the Robinson-
Patman Act, when Congress said it wanted to forbid price discrimination to
protect competition, they said it with a wink. I don't think it's a judge's job to
enforce winks."
Judge Bork had rather definite ideas on what a judge should do if presented
with an argument he believes to be economically unsound. "If a judge is told
that a tying arrangement, the linking of one product to another, is a company's
way of leveraging itself into a monopoly in a new market, that's roughly the
equivalent of being told that a man jumped out of the window and fell up," he
said. "If a judge knows that, he shouldn't let that go to the jury."
Under the premise that "it is entirely proper that the law changes as
economic understanding progresses," he said that "once we know what is going
on, there is no reason we should keep doing harm rather than good."
Id.
193. This article has been structured to avoid debating the appropriate use of law and
economics to resolve common law and statutory cases. Posner's productivity is legend. See,
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fields as antitrust, Bork has agreed with Posner. 194 Judges Easter-
brook' 95 and Winter'9 6 have also written extensively in favor of a legal
system that only regulates the market when there is fraud, duress, or
monopoly-with those terms being narrowly defined and applied.
Only Judge Scalia has been more tolerant of market regulation.' 97
Because Posner frequently has applied economic analysis to such
constitutional questions as racial discrimination, privacy, and the
fourth amendment, his vision is potentially far more activist than
Bork's view. While Bork defers to legislative decisions because he has
no power or ability to distinguish between right and wrong, Posner
e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). The
titles alone suggest the breadth of his scholarship as well as his belief in the broad applicability
of economics. Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV.
851 (1981); Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the
Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602
(1979); Landes & Posner, Saviors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Landes & Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); Posner, Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1979); Posner, Gratuitous Promises in
Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977); Posner
& Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
194. Bork has presented similar views, particularly in the antitrust field. See, e.g., R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); Bork, Antitrust and the
Theory of Concentrated Markets, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 873 (1978).
195. Easterbrook has also argued on behalf of deregulation. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and
the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. LAW & EON. 23 (1983); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies
and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L..REV. 89 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover
Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981). Winter has
contributed to the theory.
196. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); R. WINTER, THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE VERSUS THE CONSUMER
(1972).
197. Scalia's work has been more moderate. In his thorough discussion of the Consumer
Product Safety Act, he concludes that the law can be useful: "The success of the legislation
will depend upon whether the balance between these competing procedural safeguards was
wisely struck and can be effectively maintained. . . . Much depends upon the vigor and
strictness of implementation." Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer
Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973). Even when he seems to criticize the D.C.
Circuit's excessive judicial activism over administrative actions, his remedy would approach
the court's solution of requiring more procedures than currently exist in the Administrative
Procedure Act: "I would settle for an APA that contains not merely three but ten or fifteen
basic procedural formats .... Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C, Circuit, and the
Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345. Scalia warns against perfect resolution of the
sovereign immunity question. "[Accept] the fact that such reconciliation is, and probably will
remain unattainable; to explain why this is so; and to suggest why it is not so bad." Scalia,
Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some
Conclusions From the Public Land Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970).
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criticizes certain laws for inefficiency. This approach to constitutional
law can reincarnate the discredited economic due process doctrine.
Applying this approach, courts could hold unconstitutional many
laws, such as the minimum wage law, because they are economically
inefficient. Thus, Judge Posner would be engaging in a form of judicial
activism that both he and Bork consider illegitimate:
Decisions made by so unrepresentative, so isolated, indeed so
oligarchic an institution as the federal judiciary lack legitimacy
when the courts stray into areas, as increasingly they have been
doing, where they cannot point either to an authoritative text or a
national consensus to support their decisions.
198
Posner has never argued for total revival of Lochner's economic
due process jurisprudence. Yet his efforts to construe the fourteenth
amendment contain a peculiar mix of economics, history, and text. It
is instructive to analyze his proposals by reconsidering Brown v.
Board of Education, 199 in which the Supreme Court desegregated pub-
lic schools. Brown epitomizes the modern Court's success in combat-
ting tyranny. Posner, like Bork, does not disagree with the Brown
decision.200 Although Posner is generally attracted to the idea of neu-
trality, he rejected Professor Wechsler's argument that Brown was
wrongly decided because there was no neutral principle by which to
determine whether the blacks' desire to be educated with whites
should prevail over the whites' desire to remain separated. Posner
found the appropriate principle in the historical purpose of the four-
teenth amendment: "The main purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-as is clear not only from its background but also from its little-
read sections 2 through 4-was to complete the emancipation of the
Negro. "201
Posner's historical assessment of the framers' intentions may well
be wrong, and this creates a weakness in his interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment. Just as Leonard Levy has demonstrated the nar-
rowness of the framers' conception of the first amendment, Raoul
Berger has raised similar doubts about broad readings of the four-
teenth amendment.2 °2 For instance, many supporters of the four-
teenth amendment explicitly denied that the new law would require
desegregation of public schools (including segregated schools existing
in the North).203 Liberals initially felt threatened by these historical
198. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS; CRISIS AND REFORM 213 (1985).
199. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
200. Bork has also accepted Brown. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 162, at 13-15.
201. R. POSNER, supra note 197, at 193.
202. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
203. See id. at 118.
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criticisms which questioned the legitimacy of cases ranging from
Brown to Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney.2" Yet Berger's troub-
ling history ironically presents more difficulties for conservatives such
as Bork or Posner because they claim they must be bound by the
Framers' intentions, as reflected by Posner's statement before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee: "I think the judge's duty is to try to enforce
the Constitution according to the intent with which it was drafted
rather than according to his own personal views of what is right.
'20 5
The text of the fourteenth amendment does not mandate desegrega-
tion because it does not unequivocally state that "separate but equal"
is unconstitutionally unequal.
Contemporary liberals can justify Brown on another basis: the
Framers created the concept of equality, but delegated the evolution
of that doctrine to future generations.2 °6 They are relieved to escape
the constraints of history by finding certain historical beliefs illegiti-
mate or outdated. They can open a Pandora's Box of substantive due
process to protect a variety of individual rights. If history does not
support Brown, but Brown is properly decided, then equally hostile
history does not necessarily negate the legitimacy of cases like Baker
v. Carr,2 °7 or even Roe v. Wade.2 °8
Posner again turns to history when proposing a very limited defi-
nition of substantive due process. Posner suggests that the only other
purpose of the fourteenth amendment, besides furthering the emanci-
pation of blacks and protecting the black freemen, was to prevent a
civil war. From this dubious historical assumption, he creates a "con-
sensus" test which is virtually impossible to meet because the chal-
lenged state law reflects, at the very least, the views of a majority of
state leaders: "[A] law ... deprives a person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty in violation of a fundamental social norm held by most of the
nation ... ."209 The Court thus has "the power to prevent the growth
in the states of new social institutions that would be so obnoxious to
dominant national feeling that they might kindle sectional passions of
the sort that had led to the Civil War.
2 10
Compared to Bork's positivism, Posner's standard provides some
204. See Whitney v. California, 352 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927).
205. The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981) (statement of Richard Posner, nominee)
[hereinafter cited as Confirmation Hearings-Posner].
206. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
207. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
208. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
209. R. POSNER, supra note 197, at 194.
210. Id.
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Burkean flexibility.2 ' The Constitution is sufficiently alive to prevent
certain civil wars. Yet his standard is filled with difficulties. It
assumes that the Court can somehow determine which laws or social
customs will start massive armed strife. Courts cannot easily make
such political predictions. Even if the Court makes such an assump-
tion, it still has no guidance on how to decide the case. Consider Dred
Scott v. Sanford,212 a decision which helped provoke a civil war. How
is a court to decide whether Dred Scott should have remained a slave
under Posner's test? Either upholding or striking down slavery might
trigger a civil war. Because the criteria has no independent moral
content beyond preservation of the state, it provides no guidance to
complex moral or political dilemmas. In comparison, Burke would
defer to the will of the people when they act justly, as in the American
Revolution, and he would oppose political movements he perceived as
tyrannical, including slavery.
Because small minorities are incapable of starting a civil war,
Posner's test also fails to provide protection for them. The test also
makes national opinion the law. How would Posner decide a case
where several states started experimenting with forms of socialism
that angered the majority of the country? His test could be manipula-
ble to allow significant judicial activism. A judicially active court
could easily manipulate his test to combat emerging socialism. What
if one assumes that great disparity in wealth distribution is a prime
cause of revolution and civil war? Also, the standard seems artifi-
cially narrow because it only addresses sectional disputes. If one pur-
pose of the Civil War amendments was to prevent future revolts, why
shouldn't the Court strike down state or national laws that might also
provoke civil war?
In practice, the test's greatest flaw is its extremely high burden of
proof. How can plaintiffs demonstrate that state laws will generate
such sectional strife that civil war is imminent? Substantive due pro-
cess is retained in name, but buried in fact.
While the above two standards represent controversial historical
judgments, Posner also retains economic analysis to help determine
the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Federal courts should regu-
late state laws when "state court[s] may be an unsympathetic tribunal
211. Id. at 197. Since Posner would determine the consensus primarily by looking at
existing state legislation, his test is potentially hostile to desirable and undesirable change. Id.
at 194. It is not enough to say that "[m]ost new ideas are bad." Id. at 195. When trying to
determine whether new ideas are unconstitutional, the Court should rely upon a less
speculative, but still deferential test based on general citizenry beliefs. If a majority of the
populace becomes attracted to evil, Posner's standard provides no protection.
212. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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where a federal right has been created in order to correct an interstate
externality."2"3 This standard has no historical justification; the
Framers of the fourteenth amendment never heard of externalities,
much less "interstate externalities." Posner then defines constitu-
tional externalities in a way which threatens Brown:
Most Fourteenth Amendment rights, however, simply are not
related, or are related only tenuously, to externalities. Consider the
oppression of blacks by the southern states after Reconstruction.
Unless one treats moral outrage as a cost-a step that pretty much
erases the distinction between internal and external costs-the
costs of that oppression were borne mainly by the southern rather
than the northern states.2 14
This passage demonstrates the narrowness of Posner's economic
vision. First of all, both the North and the South had to bear many
costs as a result of apartheid, even assuming it was economically effi-
cient and generated an optimum gross regional product. Externalities
can last for generations; the continuing gap between black and white
income levels, the slums, and the broken homes are all traceable back
to the venal effects of slavery transactions and of subsequent segrega-
tion. The Supreme Court's decision requiring states to educate the
children of illegal aliens provides a contemporary example.2 5 Failure
to cure this problem would generate social costs that could last for
decades.
Because he evaluates transactions primarily by their immediate
market effects, Posner ignores how certain market transactions consti-
tute long-term threats to security. He does not appreciate Burke's
argument that tyranny in one section, or one colony, threatens the
liberty of everyone: "Liberty, if I understand it at all, is a general
principle, and the clear right of all subjects within the realm, or of
none. '216 The anxiety generated by seeing one's neighbor oppressed
consists of more than moral outrage. Posner's constricted parameters
of time and personality consistently make him insensitive to the
effects of tyranny.
Posner's economic reductionism not only excludes real costs, but
also improperly discounts the only external cost he acknowledges:
moral outrage. Moral outrage should be part of constitutional adjudi-
cation. Burke saw all political decisions as primarily moral decisions.
If indignation is a cost that destroys Posner's aesthetic distinction
213. R. POSNER, supra note 197, at 175.
214. Id. at 179-80.
215. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
216. E. BURKE, Noble Lord, supra note 116, at 10.
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between internal and external costs, why should that distinction pre-
vail over a more just definition of rights? Consequently, Posner's defi-
nition of externalities fails to be politically non-neutral.
The concept of externalities is particularly pliable. For instance,
Professor Bruce Ackerman recently argued that liberals can use a
broad definition of "externalities" to justify many of their policies.
2 1
Posner even uses a loose definition of externalities to explain anti-
obscenity laws: "And the possible external effects of pornography (on
the crime rate and on the family), though they have never been mea-
sured, conceivably may justify the laws and at least explain the
intense hostility that many people feel toward pornography. '9 218 A
similar analysis could apply to far greater evils, such as segregation.
Posner tries to preserve some fourteenth amendment rights by
arguing that federal courts are necessary to protect "people who are
politically disfavored in state courts not because they are nonresi-
dents-most of them are residents-but because they lack effective
political power in the state.121 9 For example, the politically powerful
elderly do not need age discrimination laws in federal courts to pro-
tect their interests. But Posner's basic standard-the federal courts
should protect the weak-is remarkably liberal and open-ended, remi-
niscent of Professor Shapiro's thesis that the Court's first amendment
constituency is the politically powerless.22 ° Indeed, Posner adopts the
"marketplace of ideas" image of the first amendment, a far more lib-
ertarian vision than Bork's crabbed version of political speech. It is
difficult to reconcile Posner's different tests. For instance, how does
one integrate the protection of minorities theory with the anti-civil
war substantive due process standard? After all, one can argue that
homosexuals are a politically powerless, oppressed groups, yet they
are unlikely to start a civil war.
Burke's writings provide far more guidance. Burke defined tyr-
anny in terms of specific episodes, and justified dissent and mixed gov-
ernments as weapons against tyranny. Posner, however, recasts those
terms in economic imagery: "Important examples of laws that serve
the public interest, economically defined, are the provisions of the
Constitution that establish the separation of powers and guarantee
freedom of political speech, both devices for warding off a particularly
costly form of monopoly-a monopoly of political power. "221 But
217. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984).
218. R. POSNER, supra note 197, at 266.
219. Id. at 180.
220. M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH; THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1966).
221. R. POSNER, supra note 197, at 265.
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unless one includes factors such as moral outrage, compassion, and
insecurity as "costs," it is possible to conclude that a monopoly of
political power might be more efficient, and might satisfy more prefer-
ences. Posner again generates political insecurity by deriving all polit-
ical values from his economic imagery. Perhaps we all would be
happier in a Brave New World of pure economic efficiency.
Finally, Burke and Posner think about slavery in radically differ-
ent ways. Posner was unable to escape from, or even reject, a tyranni-
cal implication of his economic analysis when he concluded that not
only could slavery be economically efficient,22 2 but also that economic
theory would enforce contracts where a person bargained to be a
slave.22 3 Of course, as a judge, Posner would strike down slavery laws
under the thirteenth amendment. But once again, solely because his
theory so requires, we see how Posner would tolerate, and thus legiti-
mize in the absence of text, the most evil practices. Burke, on the
other hand, always loathed slavery-he proposed to end slavery in
the colonies and gradually emancipate the slaves. Throughout his
works, references to slavery were references to tyranny.224 Indeed,
slavery plays a crucial role in Burke's thinking because it is a concrete
example of the tyranny he opposed. Thus, even without textual sup-
port, Burke might well have found the Brown decision acceptable. As
seen in his opposition to anti-Irish laws, he loathed systems that edu-
cationally deprived people, punishing them for their background.
Posner might well reply that his ruminations on the possible
scope of economic analysis are not part of his judicial jurisprudence.
As he told the Senate Judiciary Committee: "[T]he role of a judge is
very different from that of a law professor. The responsibility of a
judge is to carry out the will of others--of the legislature-rather
than to push his own academic ideas. '"225 However, Posner's change
in role will alter his views on statutes more than his scholarly consti-
tutional interpretations. Judges are more bound by specific statutes
than they are by the unamended Constitution. For instance, Posner
presumably would enforce an amended, "economically inefficient,"
antitrust law that explicitly made protection of small businesses a
222. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 102 (1981).
223. Id. at 86.
224. Burke was not the only one to see the link between oppressive governmental actions
and slavery. Before the American Revolution took place, George Washington criticized
British policies: "[T]hose from whom we have a right to seek protection are endeavouring by
every piece of art and despotism to fix the shackles of slavery upon us." Letter from G.
Washington to George William Fairfax (June 10, 1774), in 3 WRITINGS 223-24, quoted in L.
BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL; A LIFE IN LAW 19 (1974).
225. Confirmation Hearings-Posner, supra note 204, at 91.
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predominate policy. But because there are so many competing meth-
ods of how to construe the Constitution, Posner could include, as pol-
icy or philosophy, economic analysis in constitutional adjudication.
Posner's underlying commitment to economics may explain why he
has offered so many weak, but nevertheless, conflicting standards to
interpret the fourteenth amendment, and why economic analysis con-
tinues to play a major role despite his claims that judges should rely
primarily on text and history.
C. Judge Easterbrook's Economic Canons of Judicial Construction
of Statutes and the Constitution
In a series of articles on judicial construction of statutes and of
the Constitution, Judge Easterbrook supplemented Posner's and
Bork's modernist assumptions that, because one cannot choose
between preferences, judges should defer to the market and to the text
or history of laws and constitutions as the legitimate sources of power.
Easterbrook has demonstrated how this jurisprudence can survive the
ambiguities of history, language, and institutional inconsistency. He
concedes that texts are vague: "[T]here is no community of under-
standing among writers and readers of words, no meeting of the
minds." '2 26 Nor can we ever sufficiently penetrate history's veil to per-
fectly ascertain the framers' intentions: "Ultimately this approach
fails because no one can do what it requires. How many judges could
think themselves into the minds of members of Congress sitting in
1871 and 1929, or know what clauses capable of enactment in 1930
were out of the question in 1931 because of subtle changes?"2 27 Never-
theless, "a judge should in no circumstances create obligations that
cannot solidly be founded on statutes or on the text and history of the
Constitution itself."
228
226. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984).
227. Id. at 92. Easterbrook makes similar observations in determining how to apply the
antitrust laws:
I do not argue that Congress intended courts to use economics in establishing the
appropriate relation between state and federal law. I have avoided this not only
because it is impossible to determine the 'intent' of any collective body but also
because few if any members of Congress had a personal intent on the subject in
1890.
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. & ECON. 23, 40 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Easterbrook, Federalism]. He is, thus, willing to use evolving conceptions of
efficiency to modify existing laws and policies, but claims he should not use evolving standards
of justice in constitutional adjudication. It is not obvious what neutral principle makes it legit-
imate to read one's economic politics into one broad statute but precludes one from including
any sense of fairness in the constitution itself.
228. The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
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History and text provide sufficient guidance to act, but insuffi-
cient direction to act aggressively. According to Easterbrook, the
barriers of language and history are not total obstacles: "To many
questions there are answers-right answers. Often people agree on
meaning; text and history supply guides. I do not for a second sup-
pose that law is mush." ' 9 The Court can legitimately engage in
"astute guesses," but not in "wild guesses. ' 230 Yet the interpretive
problems mandate restraint: "The more we doubt the power of words
to convey meaning, the more we must doubt the authority of judges to
coerce compliance with their conclusions, and the more modest
judges must be about their demands. 2 31 Because the ambiguities of
life, law, and language combine to require judicial restraint, the pres-
ent court acts wrongly when it requires additional procedures, such as
pretermination welfare hearings, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment:
This Term's cases have no roots in history and few roots in
any decision older than twenty years .... Today the Court makes
no pretense that its judgments have any basis other than the Jus-
tices' view of desirable policy. This is fundamentally the method of
substantive due process. Giving judges this power of revision may
be wise or not. The Court may design its procedures well or
poorly. But there is no sound argument that this is a legitimate
power or function of the Court.232
Easterbrook supplements this plea for judicial constraint by com-
ingling the themes of positivism and economic theory:
The legislative and executive branches have access to informa-
tion about the costs and error rates produced by particular proce-
dures. They are well aware that the accuracy of decisions may be
improved by adopting more elaborate procedures. That they
choose not to use these procedures is strong evidence that their
costs outweigh their benefits.2 33
Thus, the State can establish any procedures it wants, including a
system where the plaintiff loses the right to file a discrimination claim
solely because the State agency failed to process his or her claim
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 456 (1984) (statement of Frank Easterbrook, nominee)
[hereinafter cited as Confirmation Hearings-Easterbrook].
229. Easterbrook's next sentence clearly illustrates how he can suddenly add an ideological
zinger to apparently innocuous commentary: "Most questions have answers, which can be
supplied without resort to politics." Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 95 n.9.
230. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983).
231. Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 98.
232. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 125.
233. Id. at 110.
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within the State's statutory limit. 23 4 Easterbrook even claims that
because all adjudication procedures are somewhat inaccurate, a lot-
tery might be acceptable. 235 He does not see how tyranny can emerge
out of arbitrary procedures.
Many of Easterbrook's articles have a consistent pattern. Begin-
ning with a series of modernist assumptions, such as the malleability
of language,236 they then propose in economic terms a variety of pol-
icy arguments, or modes of legal interpretation, that seem relatively
innocuous. But toward the end of the articles, both in the text and
footnotes, he makes numerous controversial constitutional arguments,
even while claiming his economic tests are not universal. He suddenly
reduces his flexible, realist conservatism to the economic scientism of
Posner and the positivism of Bork.237 He becomes vulnerable to the
Burkean criticism of being excessively theoretical. Easterbrook's the-
ory is also troubling because it explicity disavows considering fairness.
I can no longer resist juxtaposing Burke's lament: "But the age of
chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has
succeeded ... .-"238 Easterbrook might turn to Burke's argument that
"[p]olitical reason is a computing principle: adding, subtracting, mul-
tiplying, and dividing, morally and not metaphysically, or mathemati-
cally, true moral denominations." '239 Yet, that quotation dramatizes
another major difference between Burke and all three of the judges we
have so far considered. Burke saw politics as a moral enterprise, not
an economic one.
Easterbrook's recent exchange with Professor Tribe in the
Harvard Law Review exemplifies this pattern.24 Undeterred by Karl
Llewellyn's article demonstrating that for every judicial canon there is
a contrary canon of equal weight,24 1 Easterbrook proposes three tests:
(1) judges should be aware that their decisions create incen-
tives influencing conduct ex ante, and that attempts to divide the
stakes fairly ex post will alter or reverse the signals that are desira-
ble from an ex ante perspective;
234. Id. at 118.
235. Id. at 120.
236. Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 535.
237. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 225; Easterbrook, supra note 229.
238. E. BURKE, Whigs, supra note 82, at 86.
239. Id. at 71.
240. Compare Tribe, Constitutional Calculus. Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985) with Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority- A Reply, 98
HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985) and Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21 (1984).
241. Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 91 (citing K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 521-35 (1960)).
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(2) judges should be aware that marginal effects, and not
average effects, influence the responses to their decisions, and that
responses are pervasive; and
(3) judges should be aware of the interest-group nature of
much legislation, for this influences its meaning. 42
If we liberate those tests from their economic jargon, they are admo-
nitions to the judiciary (1) to "examine how rules affect future beha-
viour,12 4 3 (2) to be satisified with determining the general direction of
the impact of an act, not the magnitude of that impact, 2" and (3) to
be reluctant to add any new terms or implications to statutes that
primarily serve special interest groups.245
Easterbrook would probably concede that only the first two tests
are relevant for constitutional adjudication. One of the most cher-
ished modern conservative beliefs is that the Constitution was primar-
ily a patriotic document. To construe it as special interest legislation
would mean it primarily reflects the influences of large states, small
states, slaveowners, and the struggle between personalty and realty,
debtor and creditor. 246 Newer groups, such as Hispanics, or weaker
groups, such as children, would receive no constitutional protection.
Easterbrook might also reply that the Constitution's relatively vague
language reflects a public interest motivation and a wish to delegate
discretionary power to the judiciary. For example, Easterbrook has
argued that statutes drafted with broad language, such as the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, are presumably passed in the public interest and
deliberately delegate power to the judiciary, which can therefore play
242. Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985).
243. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21 (1984).
244. Id. at 34.
245. Id. at 54.
246. See, e.g., C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913). Beard's thesis that the Constitution represented a triumph of
personalty over realty interests has long been a subject of historical dispute. For an edited
collection of many of the works discussing Beard, see L. LEVY, ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1969).
Posner once wrote that the Constitution should be read as special interest legislation:
In the view proposed here, the Constitution has two purposes. One is to establish
the ground cones for a system of interest group politics; Article III is to be
understood in this light. The second is to confer protective legislation of a
peculiarly durable kind on those specially effective interest groups that are able
and willing to incur the costs necessary to obtain a constitutional provision in
their favor.
Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary In An Interest Group Perspective, 18 J. L. 8:
ECON. 875, 892 (1975).
Posner says he has tempered this view since his nomination. Margolick, Ally and Foe
Admire Bench Nominee, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at A14, col.1.
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a more active role.247
Because the first two tests seem relatively banal, why did Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe condemn so heavily Easterbrook's article? How
can one criticize awareness of future effects and acceptance of igno-
rance about the exact impact of those effects, if not the direction of
that impact?24 As Easterbrook notes in his response to Professor
Tribe's attack, he did not advocate that:
(a) all human concerns can be monetized in practice and
deployed by courts in a grand cost-benefit analysis;
(b) an application of the three normative principles leads to a
determinate outcome in all (or even most) cases; and
(c) utilitarian principles should govern all kinds of
disputes.249
Easterbrook seems to have escaped from the two Posnerian fallacies
of claiming that economic analysis determines most issues and that it
should determine those issues.
Professor Tribe has partially fallen into Judge Easterbrook's
trap. One cannot attack Easterbrook for being totally doctrinaire in
his economic analysis, by using with equal force all the arguments
raised against Posner's theories. In attacking Easterbrook, one is
tempted to launch into a purely anti-economic analysis because he
usually reaches the same conclusions as Posner does. Thus Tribe can
accuse Easterbrook of being obsessively economic at the expense of
rights, while Easterbrook can criticize Tribe for imposing upon him a
philosophy he does not endorse; they both can be correct in com-
plaining that the other is not addressing the criticisms levelled against
him. From a Burkean perspective, the major flaw with Easterbrook's
canons is not what they imply or mandate, but what they leave out:
any consideration of fairness, of morality.
Professor Tribe's overreaction is not surprising. Easterbrook's
introductory sentence makes the rich history of the Supreme Court
247. Tribe sometimes uses the economic imagery he mistrusts:
Thus, when one evaluates the impact on commerce of the regional system insofar
as it may be unauthorized, what is at stake is the marginal difference between the
complete ban on interstate banking authorized by Congress and the partial ban
chosen by the states that have decided to lift the congressional ban in part.
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 148. He does not mean to ban economics from constitutional law:
"Nothing in my critique suggests that economic insights cannot be illuminating or that courts
must ignore the light such methods may shed. My argument is with those who permit such
methods to obscure the distributive and other dimensions of choice that the methods do not
address." Tribe, Constitutional Calculus. Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 592, 619 n.161 (1985).
248. Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 92.
249. Easterbrook, supra note 241, at 623.
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resemble an automobile part: "The Supreme Court is a regulator."25
Easterbrook constantly makes controversial statements that are not
integral to his basic canons: "Separation of powers could be a talis-
man for a mindless hands-off attitude.""25  As Tribe observes, 252 Eas-
terbrook ends his article by embracing the myth that his canons are
value neutral. Yet somehow they mesh with the conservative
agenda:253 "Exclusionary rule cases, once addressed in terms of 'judi-
cial integrity' or the moral standing of the police, are today treated as
occasions for the assessment of the marginal deterrent effects of
excluding particular categories of evidence."2 Echoing both Pos-
ner's scientism and Bork's positivism, Easterbrook relentlessly
opposes morality in favor of economics and politics. He concludes a
discussion of affirmative action cases with the following: "This is not
principle; it is politics. And the Court's obligation is to enforce the
political answer, not the principled one." '255 His conclusion reaches
much further than his initial standards:
Those who would prefer the Court to follow a path emphasizing
moral rather than instrumental values find the Court's course dis-
tressing ... [but Easterbrook concludes]: Judges must be honest
agents of the political branches. They carry out decisions they do
not make. Judges who appreciate the economics of legislation and
the markets will be good agents as well as honest ones.2 56
Apparently liberals are not just illegitimate, they are bad and
dishonest.
Professor Tribe is not just responding to a few isolated comments
in an article dealing primarily with statutory construction. In much
of his previous work, Easterbrook has also linked relatively noncon-
troversial theories of judicial construction with extremely controver-
sial applications. When Tribe accuses Easterbrook of being
insensitive to the first amendment in his approval of how the Court
decided to prohibit protesters from sleeping in at Lafayette Park in
250. Easterbrook, supra note 242, at 4.
251. Id. at 41. Tribe is troubled by Easterbrook's tendency to put cost-benefit analysis at
the top of all analytical hierarchies: "It may be that Professor Easterbrook believes the vague
structural norms of the Constitution to be relevant to decision making only when they happen
to coincide with the results of an appropriate cost-benefit analysis." Tribe, supra note 246 at
593 n.9.
252. Tribe, supra note 246, at 597 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 242, at 59-60).
253. Tribe observes that to the degree neutrality has any determinate meaning, it blindly
affirms the status quo. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 189. He makes the same point in his critique
of Easterbrook's article. Tribe, supra note 246, at 600.
254. Easterbrook, supra note 242, at 59 n.157.
255. Id. at 56 n.141.
256. Id. at 60.
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Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,"' one should assume
Tribe is also aware of Easterbrook's earlier approval of Justice Stew-
art's warning against "the dangers that beset us when we lose sight of
the First Amendment itself, and march off in blind pursuit of its 'val-
ues.' 258 Easterbrook puts the burden of proof on individual rights,
omitting their benefits: "[T]he creation and maintenance of rights is
very costly. ' 259 He seems to forget his theory that the Court can be
more aggressive when interpreting open-ended public interest legisla-
tion, such as the Constitution: "Miranda, the abortion cases, and
other statute-like decisions offend in this way by announcing that the
Constitution contains a level of detail that is plainly missing.
260
Easterbrook's conservative politics constantly emerge out of his
canons. Not only is cost-benefit the preferred technique, but also the
Court should defer to the legislative assessment of costs and benefits
both in special interest statutes261 and in determining the amount of
process due under the fourteenth amendment.2 62  Thinking about
effects, and their costs and benefits, does not mandate such positivism.
Judicial withdrawal may be very costly in terms of future legislative
behavior and the direction of that behavior. For example, if legisla-
tures can terminate welfare benefits any way they want, they may try
to terminate government contracts and licenses to practice law any
way they want.
Easterbrook also endorses the current conservative theory that
constitutional adjudication should consist of text and history. Yet
when he defines the scope of due process, jobs but not welfare are
protected under his idiosyncratic definiton of "natural liberty.
2 63
Indeed, a somewhat Lochnerian assumption against government regu-
lation in the market permeates his analysis: "Those who wrote and
approved the Constitution thought that most social relations would be
governed by private agreements, customs, and understandings, not
resolved in the halls of government. ' '261 Yet, as his previous reserva-
tions about Roe v. Wade2 65 indicate, he has not extended this privacy
257. 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
258. Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 19 n.546.
259. Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 89 n.2.
260. Easterbrook, supra note 231, at 93 n.24.
261. Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 544.
262. Easterbrook, supra note 231, at 110.
263. Easterbrook's reply might be that he explicitly reserved special due process protection
for gainful employment, but that this protection cannot be derived nonpolitically. For a
discussion of these protected categories and the results they bring to those who attempt to
categorize, see Easterbrook, supra note 232.
264. Id.
265. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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expectation to the sexual world.2 66 Finally, when forced to choose
between history and economics, he chooses economics:
The economics of federalism offers a way to approach the state-
federal problem with an eye to maximizing efficiency and thus to
achieving the substantive goal of antitrust. A historical approach,
by contrast, probably would permit states to adopt any form of
regulation they chose, even forms that imposed monopoly
overcharges on neighbors.2 67
Once again we see elaborate models built to determine legitimacy
which are quickly scuttled when they conflict with the theorist's
politics.
D. Judge Scalia's Abstract Theory of Equal Rights
Frank Easterbrook's combining indeterminancy with law and
economics represents a transition from the theoretical work of Posner
and Bork to the more straightforward jurisprudence of Judges
Antonin Scalia and Ralph Winter, Jr. These latter judges have not
made assumptions about "preference neutrality" and "preference
maximization" cornerstones of their legal theory. Although they
agree with the other judges that text and history are the primary legit-
imate sources of constitutional law, they frequently utilize other
forms of constitutional argument.
The affirmative action issue reveals the futility of the conserva-
tive efforts designed to limit judicial review, to separate law and poli-
tics. Scalia's argument against affirmative action, a policy that all five
judges oppose,268 consists primarily of an abstract principle: "I owe
266. Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 549. Posner has written extensively on privacy. He
creates a hierarchy of privacy interests. With virtually no historical support, he argues that
perhaps seclusion was the only protected privacy interest. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 190. He tolerates certain secrecy
interests since the costs of losing communications outweigh the benefits. Id. at 178. Sexual
liberty deserves little protection since it is the liberty to do something, not the freedom from
some governmental action. Id. at 193.
Posner agrees there should be a tort against the publication of embarrassing private facts.
Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978). He extends his analysis to seclusion
and defamation in a later piece. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1979).
267. Easterbrook, Federalism, supra note 226, at 42.
268. At his Senate Confirmation hearing, Judge Easterbrook agreed with converted Senator
Strom Thurmond that the Constitution is "color-blind." Confirmation Hearings-
Easterbrook, supra note 227, at 457. Ralph Winter has also condemned the policy: "A
prohibition on racial discrimination is designed to permit minorities to compete without being
disadvantaged by racism. Quotas, on the other hand, are designed to obviate the need to
compete." Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality. From Equality Before the Law to the
Welfare State, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 741, 747.
Judge Posner has written several articles criticizing affirmative action. See, e.g., Posner,
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no man anything, nor he me, because of the blood that flows in our
veins."' 269 Affirmative action violates a "presumption against discrim-
ination by race."' 270 It unfairly grants preferences to the son of a black
lawyer over the son of a recent refugee from Eastern Europe: "[I]t is
based upon concepts of racial indebtedness and racial entitlement
rather than individual worth and individual need; that is to say,
because it is racist.
271
Scalia also resorts to a variety of policy arguments. Affirmative
action, he argues, is counterproductive because it impairs minority
members from distinguishing themselves solely because of their
merit.272 He even uses statistical arguments: the scheme has not been
demonstratively effective because there was an increase in black
wealth before affirmative action and a decline thereafter.273 Nor can
one argue whites have agreed to affirmative action just because certain
institutions have adopted the policy. 274  If Scalia were appointed to
the Supreme Court, he probably would join Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist in holding that all affirmative action programs based upon
race violate equal protection.275
Although proponents of the scheme can reply that the benefits of
affirmative action outweigh the costs, Judge Scalia's philosophical
arguments theoretically may be more just than the liberals' utilitarian
The Bakke Case and the Future of 'Affirmative Action', 67 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1979); Posner,
The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities,
1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1; see also R. POSNER, supra note 221, at 351-408.
Posner does not use efficiency to justify a rule proscribing governmental distribution of
benefits and costs since race "may be a good proxy for functional classifications." Posner, The
DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, supra at
22. The author certainly does not quarrel with excluding his definition of efficiency to resolve
affirmative action issues, but this is another example of using efficiency selectively to resolve
certain constitutional issues but not others. For instance, Posner resorts to economic theory to
evaluate fourth amendment doctrine, arguing that "[iun contrast to the right to vote and
freedom of speech, the nature of the right protected by the fourth amendment invites the
private-law perspective of this paper." Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup.
CT. REV. 49, 62. Thus, he uses efficiency selectively to enforce and define a hierarchy of
rights. And he cannot claim any historical or textual basis for his concluding that the
exclusionary rule over-deters. Id. at 80. Indeed, he overlooks the fourth amendment's
mandate that citizens be "secure." Security can mean more than knowing the police are
efficient; security may also include an extra layer of deterrence. Once again, Posner focuses on
the costs and benefits of excluding one piece of evidence at one trial and minimizes the general
insecurity costs of admitting that evidence.
269. Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 153.
270. Id. at 148.
271. Id. at 154.
272. Id. at 154-55.
273. Id. at 156.
274. Id. at 150.
275. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting).
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claim that affirmative action is necessary to prevent racial polariza-
tion.276 Also, one should not quarrel with the decision to sometimes
rank moral philosophy above history and even predicted effects. For
instance, the Court correctly decided Brown 277 even if the sociological
data had proved that blacks were not suffering from segregated
education. 78
If any of these five judges, however, find affirmative action to
always be unconstitutional, they would be practicing the very judicial
activism they claim is illegitimate. They would be imposing their ver-
sion of equality upon the legislative majority. They would have to
override majoritorian preferences in cases such as Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick,27 9 in which Congress provided that local governments must
spend ten percent of all federal funds allocated to local public works
projects on services or supplies provided by minority owned busi-
nesses. The judges are relying upon a theory of justice that ignores
the history of the fourteenth amendment and the history of oppres-
sion of certain discrete and insular minorities. As Posner observed,
one undisputed purpose of the Civil War amendments was to protect
the blacks. Nor were the Framers thinking of possibly outlawing
affirmative action. If anything, one could consider the "Forty acres
and a mule" slogan such a scheme. The text of the amendments does
not state conclusively that majorities are prevented from temporarily
limiting some of their own rights so that victimized minorities can
recover and thrive. These conservatives make text and history bow to
abstract conceptions of justice, minimizing Burke's observations that
circumstances are crucial to the finding of a right. They are caught in
a dilemma where many of their general rules of judicial review can be
used against them. For instance, an advocate of affirmative action
could argue that because the affirmative action issue is a relatively
new issue, the right of white males not to be discriminated against by
affirmative action is a suspect "new right."
By imposing their political views of equality upon the majority,
these conservatives also have violated their own argument that judi-
cial activism undercuts proper separation of powers. For example,
Judge Scalia endorsed James Madison's comment that the doctrine of
separation of powers is more sacred than any other in the Constitu-
tion,280 even though the doctrine can only be inferred from the struc-
276. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1978).
277. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
278. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955).
279. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
280. Scalia, Bicentennial Institute Proceedings, 28 AD. L. REV. 569, 686 (1976).
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ture of the document.28' Scalia sounds like Burke in his defense of
separation of powers: "[T]hat feature, above all others, was to assure
the absence of despotism. ' 282 Perhaps Scalia would defend judicial
activism outlawing affirmative action by referring to his argument
that the Court has a limited antimajoritarian responsibility: "[Ilts
traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities
against impositions of the majority." '283 But this concession legiti-
mizes many Warren Court opinions, ranging from Baker v. Carr 284 to
Roe v. Wade.285 We are then no longer in the black and white world
of legitimacy, but in the more ambiguous world of trying to determine
when the Court should overrule majorities in light of many competing
pressures and arguments.
Scalia's analysis of the legislative veto, which the Supreme Court
subsequently found to be unconstitutional,286 provides another exam-
ple of his broad constitutional methodology. Text and history
predominate in his analysis, but they are not exclusive: "Custom or
practice may give content to vague or ambiguous constitutional provi-
sions, but it cannot overcome the explicit language of the text, espe-
cially when that text is supported by historical evidence that shows it
means precisely what it says. "287 As with affirmative action, Scalia
supplements his argument by describing some of the "unfortunate
effects" of allowing the veto. Congress could delegate power too
broadly because of the availability of this rarely used tool. 288 Single
congressional committees would effectively control entire executive
bureaucracies. 289 As the veto works its way through the many stages
of the legislative process, which form of the veto should the agency
accept?290 Finally, congressional lobbying would never end, even
after the initial bill had been passed. This is "nonlegislation," says
Scalia, "Congress has not finished its job. '2 91
Scalia concludes with "several rather philosophical observa-
tions. ' 29 2 Society seems to be forgetting that separation of powers is
281. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 894.
284. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
285. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
286. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
287. Scalia, supra note 280, at 689.
288. Id. at 691.
289. Id. at 692.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 693.
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"the cornerstone of our Constitution. ' 293 He makes the Burkean
argument that all three branches are agents of the people: "Of course
we are not an agent of Congress for purposes of administering the law.
We are an agent of the people for purposes of administering it, just as
the Congress is an agent of the people for purposes of enacting it."
294
Although Congress has a legitimate role in overseeing the executive, it
should be less deferential to the executive in its primary function of
legislating.295 Such a broad perspective, not as bound by theories of
personality or of economics, is more Burkean in its flexibility than the
jurisprudence of Bork or Posner.
E. Judge Winter's Theories of Equality
In his confirmation testimony before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Judge Winter discussed how the conservative constitutional
methodology is not only preferable, but also is, in fact, mandatory.
Many Warren Court decisions were not just ill-advised, they were
unconstitutional:
[W]hen a court perceives that a problem exists and there is no leg-
islation dealing correctly with the problem, in the view of the judi-
ciary, a court is free to seek out what it thinks is the best solution
to the problem [sic] that if an issue was raised as a constitutional
issue and there is nothing specifically in the Constitution about it,
courts are free to decide what the Constitution ought to say about
it. I have criticized that attitude in the past. I think it is an uncon-
stitutional performance of the judicial function .... 296
If these conservatives' antipathy toward affirmative action
reveals a methodological inconsistency, Winter's general observations
demonstrate the potential extent of that inconsistency. If certain
Supreme Court opinions are illegitimate, then a subsequent Court
should reverse them. In so doing, the new Justices may deny they are
acting politically; they would only be enforcing judicial restraint
through "neutral principles." Thus a judicial or legal revolution with
profound political repercussions would be based upon political theo-
ries of judicial review that are allegedly passive. The dramatic effects
of the reversals would be called "side-effects" because the judges
would claim they were not implementing their values but deferring to
existing structures. But this conservative structuralism does not
include deference to the Supreme Court. Partially out of ignorance
293. Id.
294. Id. at 694.
295. Id. at 695.
296. The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981) (statement by Professor Winter, nominee).
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and partially out of humility, the new conservatives are unwilling to
defer to the historical tradition of a major political institution, solely
because it has not consistently adopted their particular views. These
new conservatives, who would change so much law, refuse to accept
an institutional history with which they disagree. They do not heed
Burke's advice that they should acknowledge their own ignorance and
humility by not totally undercutting the values of existing institutions
simply because those structures do not completely follow their partic-
ular political theory.
Winter also reveals how deeply political theory penetrates consti-
tutional adjudication when he discusses whether or not the equal pro-
tection clause mandates wealth redistribution. Winter creates an
abstract distinction between two competing definitions of equality:
equality before the law versus equality of social-political-economic
status.2 97 In his defense of "highly individualistic" equality before the
law, Winter is reviving Burke's distinction between legal equality and
"levelling."
Although he concedes that the "truly poor" need help, Winter
makes the sociological argument that much of the money has been
wasted on intermediaries. 98 Winter uses arguments from the law and
economics school when he states that wealth redistribution reduces
capital expenditures and distorts market mechanisms: "[I]ncome is
the sole signal inducing the production of what society values.
299
The best way to help poor people is to make the entire society more
prosperous.3 " This reminds one of Burke's comment that the poor
need to work, and all else is a fraud.
Increased welfare has increased the power of government and
blurred the distinction between public and private sectors, violating
that separation of powers: "[C]entralized power that inheres in large
government was feared. 3 1 Soon, every group is at the trough:
"None of these programs directly helps the genuinely poor, but all
penalize consumers or taxpayers; we accept them as routine exercises
of government's legitimate responsibility. In reality, the modern wel-
fare state is little more than a mechanism by which politically power-
ful groups vote themselves subsidies.1
3 °2
Winter does not omit these policy arguments when he turns to
the equal protection issue: "[T]he result might well be to affect the
297. Winter, supra note 249, at 741.
298. Id. at 748.
299. Id. at 753.
300. Id. at 754.
301. Id. at 742.
302. Id. at 749.
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total wealth of the society adversely and to increase poverty in an
absolute sense. '30 3 But he first invokes the text and history theme to
repudiate using the equal protection clause to justify income redistri-
bution: "[I]t not only finds no support in the language or discernible
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause but fairly flies in their
face." 3" According to Winter, Social Darwinism heavily influenced
the Framers and they never could have believed their amendment
would be so interpreted.3 °5
Winter gravitates toward the abstractions of the conservative law
and economics school when he acknowledges Bork's value preference
criticism, but skirts endorsement by stating: "Be that as it may
... * ,306 He later notes that the "fundamental rights" theory
"depends almost entirely on the value preferences of individual Jus-
tices. ' 30 7 He also agrees with Bork that one must neutrally apply all
legal principles, even though the concepts themselves need not be neu-
tral. The Constitution itself can contain non-neutral principles.30 8
And like Bork, he finds legitimacy primarily in "particular govern-
mental processes." Once again we see deference to structures because
they exist, not because they in fact reduce oppression. Fortunately,
Winter interprets "processes" rather broadly to justify decisions
granting criminal indigents free appellate transcripts30 9 and outlawing
a $1.50 poll tax.310 Nevertheless, we continue to see this fetish for
structures for their own sake, not because the structures actually com-
bat tyranny. Nor do we see any concern that these structures may
themselves sometimes be tyrannical. The conservatives should argue
that deferring to markets and ballot boxes normally best combats tyr-
anny, but they should also concede that market and ballot box failure
to combat oppression should justify judicial intervention.
Winter rejects the argument that there is no limit of "just wants"
that must be provided poor people because there is no consensus as to
what those wants are.3 ' Indeed, the real issue is over relative depri-
vation, not absolute deprivation.3 1 2 Finally, wealth redistribution is
suspect because courts would have great difficulty managing a welfare
303. Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SuP. CT.
REV. 41, 62.
304. Id. at 43.
305. Id. at 46.
306. Id. at 53.
307. Id. at 58.
308. Id. at 90.
309. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
310. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
311. Winter, supra note 303, at 70.
312. Id. at 71.
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system. Judicial competence becomes a constraint, and thus a consti-
tutional argument:313 "In any event, there is no transcendent income
line below which is poverty. ' 31 4 Winter includes in his article a dis-
cussion of how much is actually being spent to combat poverty. He
concludes by analogizing his opponents' arguments to the substantive
due process era of Lochner: "Thus it is that any observer concerned
about maintaining constraints on judicial power is likely to view fur-
ther intervention by the Court in the name of reduction of income
inequality more as a seizure of power than a legitimate exercise of
judicial review.
3 15
Winter has created a false dichotomy with his two theories of
equality. Although he can certainly quote Burke to support his dis-
like of welfare and his belief in the market, a third option exists aside
from levelling and formal equality. Wealth redistribution, like judi-
cial activism, is part of our historical and institutional heritage. Even
Winter seems to find it acceptable in certain limited circumstances,
such as free appellate criminal transcripts (and presumably, free law-
yers for indigents facing capital charges). Equality can also require
prevention of gross deprivation, such as starvation, malnutrition, and
death by freezing, without being a totally levelling force. Winter's
theoretical opposition to gradual evolution in the constitutional defi-
nition of equality may prevent a needed reform.
Unlike so many constitutional theorists, Winter frequently cites,
in a Burkean fashion, current political actions as examples to support
his arguments. For instance, he uses the failure to discuss affirmative
action in the 1976 Presidential campaign as an example of the impo-
tence of the elected branches.31 6 To demonstrate how equality is
threatening the "marketplace of ideas" assumption underpinning the
first amendment, Winter finds examples throughout the political
spectrum:
The Nixon Administration's quarrels with the media invoked
the rhetoric of equality in charging that centralized control permit-
ted the deliberate slanting of news and commentary in favor of the
forces of the Left, and even today Kevin Phillips calls for greater
government regulation of the media in the name of equalizing
influence. Liberals, on the other hand, want to control campaign
financing and lobbying in the name of equalizing political
communication. 317
313. Id. at 92.
314. Id. at 98.
315. Id. at 102.
316. Winter, supra note 249, at 751.
317. Id. at 752.
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This final quote reflects a difference between Winter and the
other four judges; he is willing to criticize both the liberals and con-
servatives. He has worked for both camps, as a member of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union and as a consultant for the American
Enterprise Institute. We have previously seen how he might apply
conservative theories to justify liberal decisions such as Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections3" 8 and Griffin v. Illinois.31 9 This undercur-
rent of libertarianism, with its commitment to individuality, does not
completely fit with his deference to legislatures. But Burke has shown
us that perfect consistency, which usually is the pride of a legal aca-
demic, may be the sin of a political leader.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fortunately, law review articles do not end like chess games;
there is no clear win, lose, or draw. The conservatives can reply that
this article has actually demonstrated significant agreement between
Burke and the conservatives on such issues as political dissent, reap-
portionment, wealth redistribution, market regulation, and arguably,
desegregation. But even if the reader has found this application of
Burke strained, similar to wondering what Pascal would think of
indifference curves,32 the article does raise at least one troubling
question about the methodology of contemporary conservative
jurisprudence.
In these judges' efforts to theoretically constrain liberal judicial
activism, they have left themselves little room to fight new forms of
fascism, whether those forms emerge from the extreme right or left.
They thus are missing what I believe was the basic structural purpose
of the Constitution: it was designed to combat tyranny in any
form,32' and all the branches of government were to participate in
that perpetual struggle. Burke has given us numerous examples of
tyranny: lawlessness, intolerance, slavery, total concentration of
power, ideological fanaticism. But just as power is plastic, so is tyr-
anny. Modern forms include Jim Crow laws, apartheid, concentra-
tion camps, and genocide. I believe that the Court has both the duty
and authority to fight such evils. Indeed, if the Court fails to battle
gross wrongs, or becomes a party to them, I shall be quick to com-
plain of abuse of judicial power, of wrongheaded judicial activism or
passivity. As Burke explained, a set of principles exist that both limit
318. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
319. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
320. STIGLER, Festschriften, in THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE MARKET PLACE 37 (1984).
321. See Sedler, supra note 4.
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and justify the powers of each branch of mixed government. The
Court has a Burkean duty to perform its role in a mixed government
as an active opponent of oppression. It should not defer to evil
because it believes evil is unrecognizable, or because it has no power
or duty to interfere. The Court may agree with Burke that some evil
must be tolerated, but the Court should retain a trump card (place it
in the structure if you wish) to combat the most egregious attempts to
dominate. Arguably, such tyranny only manifests itself in extreme
cases; perhaps only the desegregation and reapportionment cases
qualify. Nor have I tried to precisely define tyranny in this work.
Nevertheless, the Burkean perspective provides at least a minimal def-
inition of legitimacy that is far different and far better than the con-
temporary conservatives' viewpoints, or Professor Tribe's position
that legitimacy is dangerously indeterminate. 22
The modern conservatives might defend their modes of construc-
tion as principled attempts to constrain a presently tyrannical judici-
ary. But by trying so rigidly to separate powers through commitment
to an abstract collection of assumptions, they have isolated and weak-
ened judicial powers and responsibilities. Such a failure neither con-
serves all that the Court has done well, nor preserves the power to do
all that it ought to do in the future. Perhaps a "justice" loophole
exists in the conservatives' arguably inconsistent position that affirma-
tive action is unconstitutional. If they let their vision of justice resolve
that question, perhaps they will consider other forms of justice and
injustice.
These concluding criticisms reveal several dilemmas about con-
sistency. I have frequently accused the five judges of being excessively
ideological, and then complained about their refusal to include any
sense of justice in their jurisprudence. I have bemoaned their rigidity,
and then jumped at their inconsistency when they apparently have
included some version of justice in their politics. Of course, critics of
judicial activists have built the same Procrustean bed. Professor
Wechsler criticizes the Court for not using "neutral principles," '23
while Bork attacks it for being too abstract.3 24 I cannot escape these
dilemmas any more easily than they can or Burke did, when he pro-
posed a political theory in opposition to excessive political theory.
Burke provides some direction by describing examples of tyranny.
322. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 7.
323. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961).
324. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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Such an approach is preferable to either total indeterminancy or
positivism.
While I have used the word "legitimacy" to evaluate different
conservative modes of thought, why have the five judges so often uti-
lized the word? Perhaps one reason is that the word's very strength
allows them to be judicially active without claiming to be so. It is a
tool of radical conservatism. In a recent speech, Bork listed what he
considered to be the legitimate sources of constitutional authority:
"the constitutional text and structure, judicial precedent, and the his-
tory that gives our rights life, rootedness, and meaning. "325
If judicial precedents are also legitimate sources of power, as
Bork concedes, then he ought to comply with cases he has severely
criticized, such as Roe v. Wade, 326 even if he were appointed to the
Supreme Court. But if he continues to believe that those cases are
illegitimate, even unconstitutional, then there is no reason for him to
heed Burke's admonitions to defer partially to the Court's past prac-
tices and traditions, because the Court has been a partial repository of
our country's collective wisdom.32 7
These contemporary conservatives cannot have it both ways. If
they wish to be Burkean, they should formulate a broad definition of
justice to aid in the battle against tyranny. They should be deferential
to most opinions, such as Baker v. Carr328 or Roe v. Wade, which
they have labelled "illegitimate." They cannot, however, claim Burke
as a close ally if they maintain their existing constitutional ideologies.
325. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 29.
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